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ABSTRACT
Scholars have explored many ways to rearrange risk outside of
traditional insurance markets. An interesting literature addresses a
range of innovative alternatives, including the sale of unmatured tort
claims or chances at windfalls, “anti-insurance,” or “reverse
insurance,” and index-based derivatives that address routine (but lifealtering) risks, such as those to home values or livelihoods. Because
most of this work grows out of a conviction that specific risk
allocations embedded in law could be improved upon, the merits of
the newly proposed risk arrangements have taken center stage. This
Article, in contrast, examines questions surrounding risk
customization itself, such as the optimal amount of stickiness in
society’s default risk allocations, the effects of heterogeneity in risk
arrangements, and the implications (cognitive and otherwise) of
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starting from one risk baseline rather than another. My analysis
focuses on risks faced by individuals and households, where gaps and
asymmetries in risk-customization opportunities are most
pronounced, and where cognitive considerations loom large. The
Article develops a taxonomy of risk-shifting moves that illuminates
inconsistencies in existing patterns of blocked and missing risk
markets, and directs attention to untapped policy design alternatives.
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INTRODUCTION
Derek regards himself as an excellent driver, but he lives in a
jurisdiction where automobile operators are legally required to carry
liability insurance. While trudging to his local insurer to obtain the
hated insurance, he notices the offices of a new company called “At
Your Own Risk” (AYOR). Intrigued, Derek goes inside and learns
about the following “reverse insurance” offer: AYOR will cover
Derek’s annual automobile insurance premiums, but if Derek’s
insurer has to pay out any claims against him that year, Derek will
1
pay AYOR an equivalent amount, plus an administrative increment.
While filling out paperwork, Derek falls into conversation with Carla,
who is in the process of selling AYOR her right to recover tort

1. A number of scholars have examined various forms of reverse insurance or antiinsurance. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 219–20 (1970) (describing
“reverse insurance”); Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203
(2002) (proposing “anti-insurance” in contract and tort contexts); Steven P. Croley & Jon D.
Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1786, 1821, 1883–84, 1893–95 (1995) (discussing “disinsurance”); Eric Kades,
Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1496–1500 (1999) (proposing “reverse insurance” for offloading
the upside risk of windfalls); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1546 (1987) (noting a potential role for “reverse or anti-insurance”).
As the textual example illustrates, there may be both practical and legal obstacles to such
transactions. See infra Part III.
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damages from anyone who may injure her in the future. Two
windows down, Finn, who fancies himself a financial wizard, is signing
over his rights to all forms of social insurance in exchange for a lump
sum; if Finn later qualifies for any of these benefits, AYOR will be
3
entitled to claim them in Finn’s place.
As Derek, Carla, and Finn leave AYOR, pleasantly unburdened
by unwanted insurance, they pass by AYOR’s sister establishment
“Not At Your Own Risk” (NAYOR). Opal, a veterinarian who
specializes in canine ophthalmology, has just emerged from NAYOR
with “livelihood insurance” that will protect her against falling
4
returns in her chosen profession. Nina, whom prediction markets
give a 28 percent chance to win the Nobel Prize in chemistry this year,
has assigned her potential winnings to NAYOR in exchange for a
5
lump sum equal to a fraction of the prize amount. And Rick, who
hates crowds, has purchased a policy that will compensate him for
higher-than-expected population increases over the next twenty years
6
in the relatively isolated rural county where he spends his summers.
AYOR and NAYOR are fictitious enterprises, but the core idea
they embody—delinking risk or insurance from the products, services,
or endeavors with which they usually come bundled—has attracted
7
longstanding scholarly attention and carries important real-world

2. A robust literature examines the possibility of transacting over such “unmatured” tort
claims—that is, claims based on injuries that have not yet occurred. E.g., Robert Cooter,
Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 383–87 (1989); Marc J.
Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 334 (1987); Stephen
D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 642–64 (1985); see also
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 77 (1974) (explaining how a victim’s right to
payment upon death could compensate him for risk impositions if “[w]hile alive, he can sell the
right to this [postmortem compensation] payment, should it have to be made, to a company that
purchases many such rights”); Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 822, 867 (1993) (illustrating the “[t]ransferred [c]laim rule” with an example in which
“Arlene purchases from Gladys any future claims to monetary compensation for injury by
Sheldon”); infra Part II.B.1.
3. For a discussion of the potential for, and impediments to, sales of social insurance, see
infra Part II.D.3.
4. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY
107–10 (2003) (describing one version of livelihood insurance); see also infra Part II.D.
5. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
7. In 1963, Kenneth Arrow posited the possibility of complete markets in risk, which
would allow anyone “to bet, at fixed odds, any amount he wishes on the occurrence of any event
which will affect his welfare in any way.” KENNETH J. ARROW, Insurance, Risk and Resource
Allocation, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 134, 138 (1971) (publishing a lecture
originally delivered in the Yrjö Jahnsson lecture series in Helsinki in December 1963). The
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8

implications. Despite significant academic and entrepreneurial
interest in expanding risk markets, however, the stakes that
individuals hold in the outcomes of a wide range of activities and
enterprises continue to follow deeply entrenched patterns. People are
often unable to modify the risk positions specified by background
legal and social arrangements, whether those positions produce
9
unwanted coverage or unwanted exposure. These rigidities, however,
are not uniformly distributed. Not only are there striking differences
between the risk-customization opportunities available to
10
sophisticated financial actors and to individuals, but the suite of riskmanagement tools to which ordinary households have access is
marked by unexplained asymmetries and puzzling gaps. Examples are
plentiful: it is routine to buy fire insurance but difficult to insure
11
against the risk of fluctuations in the local housing market; it is
common to forgo life insurance on one’s minor children but
Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model, developed in prior work by Arrow and by Gerard
Debreu, contemplates complete markets in contingent claims. E.g., DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN
ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 35, 345 n.36 (2002) (citing
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing, 31 REV.
ECON. STUD. 91 (1964), translated from the original 1953 French version; GERARD DEBREU,
THEORY OF VALUE: AN AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, ch. 7 (1959)); see
also Robert Hockett, What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPS,
Other SOPS, and “Ownership Societies,” 92 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 945–46 & n.332 (2007)
(discussing the intellectual history of “Arrow securities,” which pay out based on various states
of the world and facilitate trading in risk).
8. For examples of actual and proposed mechanisms for rearranging risk, see infra Part II.
9. If people could shed risk and insurance with equal and perfect ease, law’s initial
allocations would not stand in the way of efficient reallocations. See R.H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also ARROW, supra note 7, at 134–43 (discussing and
analyzing incompleteness in insurance markets).
10. Derivatives are used by business entities to transfer risk in innumerable ways. PHELIM
BOYLE & FEIDHLIM BOYLE, DERIVATIVES: THE TOOLS THAT CHANGED FINANCE, at xi
(2001). Indeed, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan explicitly described
them as adding value by “unbundling risks.” Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd.,
Remarks Before the Futures Industry Association: Financial Derivatives (Mar. 19, 1999),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19990319.htm. To allude to
such risk-shifting mechanisms in the current economic climate invites the reaction that riskrearrangement innovations should be more tightly curtailed rather than made more broadly
available. A discussion of the causes of the financial crisis is beyond the scope of this Article,
but the difficulties have been broadly associated with the mispricing of risk. For a recent
overview, see generally Susan M. Wachter, The Ongoing Financial Upheaval: Understanding the
Sources and Way Out, 13 INT’L REAL EST. REV. 218 (2010). It is true that trading in risk is a
condition precedent to mispricing it, but pricing flaws can be addressed without dismantling risk
markets altogether.
11. Some explicit mechanisms do exist for hedging or insuring against housing-market
risks, but these are not in widespread use and are unavailable as a practical matter to the great
majority of households. See infra Part II.C.1.
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impossible to shed the implicit insurance against their deaths that
12
comes bundled with the tort system; it is unremarkable to retain an
entitlement to risky future income streams but unusual to explicitly
sell off the right to receive them—and virtually unheard of to place
13
bets that would double one’s return from them.
The absence of explicit risk markets in a given domain does not
mean that people are utterly unable to adjust their exposure to
variance. The point, rather, is that they often can do so only by
selecting or refusing a package that also contains some other good,
service, activity, or endeavor. For example, a person who does not
14
want to risk a loss in home value can rent instead. An individual who
does not want the high variance in income that characterizes a life as
an artist can sell her labor to an employer pursuant to a long-term
contract. Within limits, one can work at a riskier job in exchange for
higher pay or consume cheaper products that come with greater
health and safety risks. But outside of a few varieties of insurance,
individuals have few opportunities to engage in free-standing or
unbundled risk adjustments.
The distinction between bundled and unbundled risk
transactions is not trivial. If risk levels cannot be independently
adjusted, heterogeneous risk preferences can distort other
consumption and activity choices, reduce welfare, or both. Certain
kinds of private bargains capable of improving incentive structures
15
are also precluded if risk cannot be traded separately. More broadly,
society’s policy menu is impoverished if individuals cannot undo risk
allocations that are packaged within particular societal arrangements,
or if they can only reduce exposure from a given baseline but not
increase it.
Risk innovation always attempts a finer-grained unbundling of
risk from the products, services, conditions, or activities in which it is

12. For discussion of why people might be interested in shedding this coverage, see infra
text accompanying notes 34–35 and infra text accompanying notes 100–02102.
13. The conceptual case for such a bet is set out in Cooter & Porat, supra note 1, at 218–21.
14. Similarly, one can hedge against future price increases in a given local housing market
by actually buying a house in that market or in a correlated market. See Todd Sinai & Nicholas
S. Souleles, Owner-Occupied Housing as a Hedge Against Rent Risk, 120 Q.J. ECON. 763 (2005).
15. For example, “anti-insurance” contracts that place the risk of loss on both parties to an
interaction require the participation of a third party that can enter into transactions over risk.
See Cooter & Porat, supra note 1, at 204–05 (describing these contracts, which would “requir[e]
the promisor to pay damages to a third party, instead of the promisee, in the event of
nonperformance”); infra Part I.C.
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embedded. Once unmoored, risk can be shifted in virtually
unlimited ways, allowing parties to move freely from risk to coverage
(insurance) and from coverage to risk (reverse insurance). Most of
the existing work in this area has focused on the merits of revised risk
17
allocations within particular contexts. This Article takes a different
tack by examining questions surrounding risk unbundling itself—the
costs and benefits of allowing people to reverse default risk
18
arrangements selectively. My analysis focuses primarily on risks
routinely encountered by individuals and households—contexts
where stand-alone risk-reallocation opportunities are often absent or
19
constrained, and cognitive and social considerations loom large. As
both a regulator and an important direct provider of risk-pooling
services, government has an interest in fostering the set of riskmodification tools that will most cost-effectively achieve its policy
ends. But it is not obvious whether this means prohibiting unbundled
risk transactions, allowing market-based moves away from default
risk allocations (with or without additional hurdles built in),
subsidizing the development of new markets in risk, or directly
providing risk-customization opportunities. As scholarly and
entrepreneurial interest in risk innovations continues to intensify,
these questions will become increasingly pressing. This Article
provides a framework for answering them.

16. Risk innovation is not always framed in these terms, but the unbundling
characterization has been explicitly used by, for example, Greenspan, supra note 10.
17. See infra sources cited Part II.B.1, on the sale of unmatured tort claims, infra Part II.C,
on the rearrangement of housing-market risk, and infra Part II.D.2, on risk shifting for income
and careers.
18. Perhaps the best-developed body of literature addressing the ability to undo
background arrangements is in the area of contract default rules. See Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE
L.J. 87 (1989); Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default
Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998). Although relevant to the present discussion—contracts
do allocate risk, among other things—a gap remains between this literature and broader
questions of risk reversibility among parties who are not otherwise in contractual relationships
with each other.
19. The possibility that people may act irrationally in making insurance decisions, and that
framing and defaults might play a role, has received significant attention. See, e.g., Eric J.
Johnson, John Hershey, Jacqueline Meszaros & Howard Kunreuther, Framing, Probability
Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993); Howard Kunreuther
& Mark Pauly, Insurance Decision-Making and Market Behavior, 1 FOUND. & TRENDS IN
MICROECON. 63, 88–97 (2005); Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Consumer Demand in Insurance
Markets, 3 ERASMUS L. REV. 23, 25–30 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 114–15 (2002).
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I do not make a normative case here for giving people vastly
expanded access to risk-rearrangement opportunities, nor do I
advocate for particular additions to the risk menu. Instead, the
project is an analytic one that classifies possible risk moves and
probes their logical and practical similarities and differences. Part of
the inquiry involves examining risk-bearing patterns and asking
whether the lines that currently separate the available from the
unavailable, the permissible from the forbidden, and the routine from
the rare track meaningful normative distinctions, or whether they are
instead artifacts of tradition or framing. For example, reverseinsurance schemes sound quite exotic, but they do nothing more than
reproduce the risk allocation that would have prevailed in the
absence of some insurance mechanism, whether explicit or embedded
20
in law or policy.
Thinking about risk customization as a distinct issue also allows
us to sharpen, refine, and differentiate among objections and
obstacles. Arguments about the merits or sustainability of a particular
risk-allocation endstate, for instance, carry different implications than
do arguments about the ease with which customization can be
accomplished or the desirability of preserving homogeneity in risk
arrangements. Likewise, some concerns about risk markets center on
features of risk reallocation that are not essential to the reallocation
itself and that are therefore amenable to design-arounds. For
example, the worry that people will sell unmatured tort claims out of
a myopic desire for an immediate lump of cash could be addressed by
restructuring the time and manner in which the expected value
21
equivalent of a potential tort claim is delivered. Here, the real
objection pertains not to the unbundling of risk from underlying tort
arrangements but rather to the failure to also unbundle risk from
certain malleable payment features.
Beyond identifying functional equivalences and spurious
connections, viewing risk as a potentially segregable element opens
the door to untapped design innovations. For example, because
reverse-insurance mechanisms are virtually unknown, it is typical to
compare mandatory insurance regimes with voluntary, opt-in regimes
while ignoring the possibility of an opt-out regime—despite the

20. For an overview of implicit insurance provided through various laws and benefit
programs, see MOSS, supra note 7, at 314–15 & tbl.10.2.
21. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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potential advantages of the latter alternative. Although I will leave
to others whether such redesigns would ultimately prove normatively
attractive, I raise them here because they offer underexplored
approaches that appear to be broadly consistent with some of the
policy goals that have been articulated in discussions of risk and
insurance.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. After briefly reviewing why
people might want to take on or shed risk, Part I presents a taxonomy
of risk-reallocating transactions. I refer to these moves collectively as
risk/expected value exchanges (REVEs). Part II surveys REVEs that
presently exist outside traditional insurance markets, as well as gaps
where new REVEs might emerge. Part III examines some of the
reasons that risk-reallocation opportunities are currently blocked or
missing and considers whether greater risk customization would
advance efficiency. Part IV synthesizes and builds on the analysis in
the previous Parts. After suggesting that existing gaps and
asymmetries in opportunities to alter risk positions do not map well
onto plausible normative distinctions, I show how minor design
tweaks might counter identified problems with certain kinds of
REVEs. I close by examining new policy alternatives that emerge
from a focus on society’s dual tasks of setting default risk allocations
23
and deciding how sticky those risk allocations will be.
I. REARRANGING RISK: WHY AND HOW
A. Why Insure or Uninsure?
To frame the analysis that follows, it is first helpful to ask why
rearranging risk might be worthwhile from either a societal or private
perspective. The standard economic account emphasizes two
considerations. First, if risk is shifted to a party who is in a better
position to reduce the odds of a negative occurrence or to increase
the odds of a positive occurrence, the shift can improve the mix of

22. For a discussion of the significance of default selections, see infra Part IV.C.
23. For a discussion of the stickiness inherent in default selections, see infra Part IV.C.1.
For ways to adjust the level of stickiness, see infra Part IV.D. Cf. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090–92 (1972) (noting that society must make two decisions about
entitlements—who will be granted the entitlement and how it will be protected).
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bad and good events. A corollary of this point is that removing risk
from a party who is in a good position to control events can lead to
25
losses due to moral hazard. This line of analysis emphasizes the
beneficial incentive effects of exposure or the detrimental incentive
26
effects of nonexposure.
Second, efficiency gains can be achieved if risk-averse individuals
transfer risk to parties who have a greater ability to diversify, spread,
27
or pool it, or who are simply less averse to risk. Risk aversion, in
turn, is typically explained by reference to the diminishing marginal
28
utility of money, which would cause people to prefer small but
certain monetary gains and losses over larger but less likely gains and
29
losses that have the same expected values. Scholars have
characterized insurance as a device for moving money from states of
the world in which it produces lower marginal utility to ones in which

24. This point is associated with Guido Calabresi’s notion of the “cheapest cost avoider.”
See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 136–38; see also MOSS, supra note 7, at 232–34 (discussing
“efficient risk shifting”).
25. See infra Part III.A.1.
26. Significantly, this set of considerations comes into play only when it is impossible to
fully disaggregate risk from factors under the control of a particular party. See infra note 186
and accompanying text.
27. See MOSS, supra note 7, at 33–35 (discussing reasons that trades in risk could produce
gains); see also Johnson et al., supra note 19, at 36 (recounting the “standard story” of insurance
as risk shifting, in which “risk-averse individuals confronted with sizable hazards will pay a more
diversified insurer to bear the risk”).
28. The diminishing marginal utility of money captures the intuition that an additional
dollar means more to a person with a small stock of wealth than it does to a wealthy person.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (7th ed. 2007).
29. An expected value is the number one gets by multiplying the probability of each
outcome by its magnitude and adding the results. People who are risk averse care about the
variance in outcomes associated with a given gamble, not just its expected value. See, e.g.,
JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 508 (3d ed. 2000) (“Your disutility for losing
$100,000 is, probably, more than 100 times your disutility of losing $1,000.”); Croley & Hanson,
supra note 1, at 1793–95 (explaining risk aversion in terms of the diminishing marginal utility of
money). Work pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky raises important challenges
to this account by finding that people show aversion to losses (from a given reference point),
rather than to risk as such, and that they are disproportionately sensitive to small losses from
that reference point. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 268–69 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 457–58
(1981); see also Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, Sarah Lichtenstein, Bernard Corrigan & Barbara
Combs, Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, in PAUL
SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 51, 67–70 (Ragnar E. Löfstedt ed., 2000) (discussing the
insurance implications of Kahneman and Tversky’s findings).
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it produces greater marginal utility. A utility-maximizing person
would continue this process until—and only until—the marginal
31
utilities are equalized across her various possible futures. The
intuition mirrors that for savings decisions. Setting aside funds makes
sense if one expects to have greater needs or lower income in the
future, but beyond a certain point, additional savings would harm
one’s current self more than they would help one’s future self.
Likewise, insurance makes sense when one will have greater needs or
lower income if an injury or loss occurs, but at some point that added
value will be outweighed by the sacrifice one’s uninjured self would
have to bear to pay the insurance premium. In Richard Zeckhauser’s
words, “The rule comes down to spending your money where it does
32
the most good.”
A focus on the diminishing marginal utility of money thus reveals
not only why people might buy insurance but also why they might
want to refrain from doing so. Money produces greater marginal
utility after an event has happened than it did before only if the event
either directly reduces one’s monetary resources, such as one’s
earning capacity, or otherwise changes one’s need for or utility from
33
money. Some of the most devastating losses that people
experience—the death of a minor child, or severe pain and
suffering—typically do not produce monetary losses and are not
usually thought to increase the marginal utility of money; in fact, they
34
may do the opposite. In these cases, moving money from the pre-loss
state of the world to the post-loss state would reduce utility. The same
reasoning explains why people might at times wish to “sell” existing

30. E.g., Richard J. Zeckhauser, Coverage for Catastrophic Illness, 21 PUB. POL’Y 149, 156–
57 (1973).
31. See, e.g., Croley & Hanson, supra note 1, at 1795 & diagram 2; Priest, supra note 1, at
1546; Zeckhauser, supra note 30, at 156.
32. Zeckhauser, supra note 30, at 155.
33. Cooter, supra note 2, at 388–92; David Friedman, What Is ‘Fair Compensation’ for
Death or Injury?, 2 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 81, 85–87 (1982); see also Croley & Hanson, supra
note 1, at 1797–1802 (providing an overview of the conventional view on this issue).
34. An extensive literature has emphasized these basic points. E.g., Cooter, supra note 2, at
389; Croley & Hanson, supra note 1, at 1797–1802; Priest, supra note 1, at 1546–47; Alan
Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353,
362–64 (1988); W. Kip Viscusi & William N. Evans, Utility Functions That Depend on Health
Status: Estimates and Economic Implications, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 353, 371–72 (1990). “Pain and
suffering” is used here to refer to those sources of physical disutility that cannot be remediated
by additional medical care or medications; to the extent such remediation can be purchased with
money, the point in the text would not hold.
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insurance (say, from a baseline of tort coverage) by accepting
35
exposure to risk in exchange for a payment.
These points, which have been marshaled in support of various
36
tort reform proposals, are open to a number of caveats and
qualifications. Perhaps most foundationally, it is no more self-evident
that individuals should wish to maximize utility over an entire lifetime
and across all possible states of the world than it is that societies
37
should want to maximize utility across their populations. Societies
might wish to ensure that all their members achieve some baseline of
well-being, even if it means that total society-wide utility falls;
likewise, individuals might care more about not sinking below a
particular absolute level of utility at any point in time than about
38
maximizing lifetime utility. Hence, even if money would not bring
nearly as much marginal utility in the state of the world in which a
given loss has occurred, insurance might still be valued for its ability
to help bring utility up to some minimum absolute level.
Even if lifetime utility maximization is the goal, it is possible that
changes in total utility levels affect the marginal utility of money,
39
independent of wealth. For example, the possibility that people
derive “consolation” utility from the fact of being compensated after
a loss, quite apart from the utility that the money itself will produce,

35. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 33, at 84; Priest, supra note 1, at 1547; see also Croley &
Hanson, supra note 1, at 1799–1802 & n.47 (discussing the conventional wisdom on this point).
36. For a survey of reforms premised on this analysis, see Croley & Hanson, supra note 1,
at 1804–12.
37. See id. at 1832.
38. See id. (“[J]ust as egalitarian considerations may justify curbing utilitarian goals in the
interpersonal world—entitling noneconomically disadvantaged citizens to redistribution even
though such transfers reduce the sum of society’s utility, wealth, or resources because such
transfers may go to those with a below-average marginal utility of resources—so too may
equalizing considerations curb maximizing goals in the intrapersonal world.”); see also
Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 38 (discussing the possibility that people may insure against
nonpecuniary losses to equalize utility across states of the world). As Steven Croley and Jon
Hanson point out, the analogy between the intrapersonal and interpersonal case is especially apt
given that the circumstances that people might occupy in certain insurable states of the world
(such as having a severe disability) are precisely those that are often raised in philosophical
challenges to utilitarianism. Croley & Hanson, supra note 1, at 1825 n.125; see also Amartya
Sen, Equality of What?, in 1 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 195, 203–04 (Sterling
M. McMurrin ed., 1980) (discussing an example in which a “pleasure-wizard” gets much more
utility out of money than a person with a disability); David A. Weisbach, Toward a New
Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 47, 71–73 (summarizing literature on
welfarism and explaining how disabilities would factor into the analysis).
39. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 1, at 1813–22; Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at
83–84.
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40

adds an interesting wrinkle. Moreover, the marginal utility of money
may not always smoothly decline across all wealth ranges; there may
be discontinuities or even wealth ranges in which the marginal utility
41
of money is increasing. For example, a person who feels her life
would utterly change if only she could purchase some indivisible good
(a new Ferrari, for example) might be risk seeking as to a bet that
42
would finance that purchase. Individual differences along these and
other dimensions are sources of heterogeneity that may prove policy
43
relevant.
As this discussion suggests, there are a variety of reasons that
people might desire more coverage or, alternatively, more exposure
in particular contexts. To get a sense of what is at stake, it is helpful to
note three broad sets of reasons why risk customization might be
valuable. First, it can enhance welfare by making available new
44
combinations of activities, incentives, and risk. A second set of
benefits flows from the idea that individuals, as autonomous agents,
should be empowered to select the risk arrangements they prefer—as

40. See Christopher K. Hsee & Howard C. Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in Insurance
Decisions, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 145–46 (2000) (presenting the “consolation
hypothesis” to explain experimental results in which people were willing to devote more time to
obtain a fixed amount of compensation for a damaged object when asked to imagine that they
loved the object); see also Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 84, 93 (discussing consolation’s
role in insurance claims behavior and its relationship to the notion of purchasing insurance “for
peace of mind” (emphasis omitted)); Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 38 (discussing the consolation
rationale for insurance against nonpecuniary losses).
41. The Friedman-Savage utility curve, which was developed to explain apparent
anomalies in risk-related behavior, embodies the hypothesis that there are intervals within
which the marginal utility of money is increasing. See Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The
Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 298–99 (1948); see also
CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 39–40; CHARLES KARELIS, THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY 67–81,
127–29 (2007).
42. For a discussion of similar explanations for lottery play, see infra note 180. Milton
Friedman and L.J. Savage likewise suggested one “possible interpretation” of seemingly
anomalous risk behavior: that people experience diminishing marginal utility when money
merely elevates them within their present social class but increasing marginal utility when
money moves them to a new social level. Friedman & Savage, supra note 41, at 298–99. For
related arguments, see, for example, CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 39–40, and KARELIS, supra
note 41, at 67–81, 127–29.
43. For example, studies suggest that people seem to simply vary in their tolerance and
taste for risk. See infra note 289. Moreover, people’s attitudes toward risk and insurance may be
heavily dependent on social norms and past experiences, as well as on framing and other
cognitive factors. See infra Part III.A.3–4.
44. For examples of the forms these new combinations might take, as well as a number of
existing models that illustrate the range of possibilities, see infra Part II.
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long as doing so does not impose costs on others. Third, unbundling
risk could produce wider societal benefits by enhancing policy
flexibility or simply by making alternative arrangements more
46
salient. That greater risk customization could bring these benefits,
however, is no guarantee that such benefits would actually be
realized. Moreover, there are important reasons why society cares
about the risk arrangements people choose—including the possibility
that those arrangements could visit harm on other people or on
47
individuals’ own future selves. Yet the potential gains are large
enough to warrant a careful examination of existing and missing
opportunities for risk rearrangement.
B. REVEs: A Taxonomy
Now that we have some idea why people might want to engage in
transactions to reallocate risk, we can begin to categorize those
transactions. Helpful in this regard is the generic, umbrella concept of
a risk/expected value exchange (REVE), which encompasses not only
insurance but many other kinds of risk transactions, including reverse
insurance. REVEs are a theoretical possibility whenever there is
48
variance in future states of the world and enough information about
49
the distribution of those states to calculate an expected value. In the
simplest REVE, one party receives or pays the expected value of a set
50
of possible future states of the world, while the other party accepts
45. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 2, at 387 (“A market for [unmatured tort claims] can be
defended solely because it gives people more options.”). Robert Cooter takes this idea of
enhanced choice only so far, however, as his proposal would require those selling their claims to
obtain first-party insurance. Id. Concerns about externalities (as well as internalities) may play a
role in limiting choice in this context. See infra Part III.B.
46. See infra Part IV. In some cases, allowing new risk transactions might facilitate societal
learning by revealing the degree to which existing default risk arrangements diverge from (or,
alternatively, track) people’s preferred arrangements. The result might be a new default or
perhaps even a new (or restored) mandatory arrangement.
47. See infra Part III.B.
48. Although risk is colloquially associated primarily with negative events, its economic
meaning refers to variance, whether positive or negative. See, e.g., Kades, supra note 1, at 1496
& n.17.
49. An important complication inheres in the possibility that the transaction itself, by
altering who bears the risk, may also alter the expected value. This point relates to moral
hazard, taken up below. See infra Part III.A.1. I thank Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi for comments on
this point. There are also some practical limits on the availability of REVEs. For example,
insurance will not be a realistic possibility if the event in question will produce widespread
correlated losses, as in the case of a nuclear war. Priest, supra note 1, at 1540.
50. The most familiar approach would be for the first party to pay or receive the expected
value upfront, regardless of what state of the world will actually obtain, as with ordinary
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the loss or gain, if any, associated with the state of the world that
actually obtains (or reconveys the bundle to someone else who will do
so). Of course, real-world REVEs involve an amount added to (or
deducted from) the expected value for administrative costs and
profits, but that factor can be safely omitted from this stage of the
51
analysis.
A more foundational wrinkle is that even the most basic and
familiar REVE, insurance, often does not involve literally offloading
potential losses (which may be nonpecuniary in nature); instead,
parties contract for a set of monetary payouts that will be triggered by
52
particular losses. To keep the analysis simple, imagine that a single
event, R, will occur with some known probability—the cosmic
53
equivalent of drawing a red ball from an urn. R may already
generate consequences for an individual, Ida. These consequences
could be given by nature (as where R is Ida’s broken arm), the
product of embedded legal arrangements (as where R is someone
else’s broken arm for which tort law makes Ida liable), or both (as
where R delivers Ida both a broken arm and some amount of
54
compensation). Or R might be some event that currently carries no
consequences for Ida, such as the outcome of a horse race on which
Ida has not yet placed any bets. In any of these situations, Ida might
prefer not to passively accept the consequences (or lack thereof) that
R produces for her in the baseline situation. She might wish to buy or
insurance. Variations would be possible in which an expected value is paid or received only in
those states of the world in which a given event does not occur. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note
33, at 84. This alternative would fit with an approach in which the expected value payment is
transferred ex post, after the risk in question has been resolved; because such an ex post
payment will not be paid in the state of the world in which the risky event occurs, the expected
value payment will be correspondingly higher. See Michael B. Abramowicz & Ian Ayres,
Compensating Commitments: The Law and Economics of Commitment Bonds that
Compensate for the Possibility of Forfeiture 8 (May 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612396 (describing an “ex post implementation” approach
that would work in this way). See also Part IV.B.1, infra, on payment timing.
51. These costs may, however, bear on the choice of a default risk allocation. See infra Part
IV.C.1.
52. As scholars have noted, insurers can only pay claims using money. E.g., Croley &
Hanson, supra note 1, at 1797; Priest, supra note 1, at 1546. An intriguing question is whether
this must inevitably be the case. In this connection, consider families and religious groups, which
not only pool financial risk but presumably often make in-kind payments of care and concern in
response to losses. I thank Alison Morantz for raising this issue.
53. Similar hypotheticals involving draws from urns have been given to participants in
research on risk and insurance. See Slovic et al., supra note 29, at 54–55.
54. R could also be an event that will carry in-kind consequences that are positive for Ida,
such as favorable weather.
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sell “tickets” that attach new consequences to, or remove existing
55
consequences from, R’s occurrence.
If Ida would like to attach a positive consequence, such as a
payout of money, to R’s occurrence, or would like to detach a
negative consequence, such as liability to pay someone else money,
from R’s occurrence, she must pay the expected value of that
56
consequence. If, on the other hand, Ida would like to detach a
positive consequence from R’s occurrence, such as money that would
ordinarily come to her when R happens, or attach a negative
consequence to R’s occurrence, such as liability to pay someone else,
she will be entitled to receive the expected value equivalent of the
57
consequence. Either way, she is engaging in a REVE—an exchange
of expected value for risk.
From Ida’s perspective, then, there are “event-enhancing
REVEs” that cost her a fixed amount of money but improve the
consequences tied to a probabilistic event like R (whether by adding a
positive consequence or detaching a negative one) and “eventdetracting REVEs” that deliver a sum certain but worsen the
consequences for her of a risky event like R (whether by tying her
future liability to R or removing some positive consequence that was
previously bundled with R). Of course, the party on the other side of
the monetary transaction experiences a converse change in the
consequences of event R. Thus, the terms “event-enhancing” and
“event-detracting” refer to two sides of the same transaction, not to
58
distinct transaction types.
1. Enhancements and Detractions. It is easy to tell whether Ida is
paying out dollars or receiving dollars, and hence transparent whether
55. HOWARD KUNREUTHER, RALPH GINSBERG, LOUIS MILLER, PHILIP SAGI, PAUL
SLOVIC, BRADLEY BORKAN & NORMAN KATZ, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC
POLICY LESSONS 47 (1978) (describing insurance and similar devices as “tickets that can be
cashed in for money if certain states of nature occur”).
56. Suppose there is a 10 percent chance of R. Under conditions of perfect competition and
zero administrative costs, Ida could pay $100 for a ticket that pays out $1,000 if R happens (and
$0 if it does not happen), or that, alternatively, relieves her of $1,000 of liability associated with
the occurrence of R.
57. Continuing with the example in supra note 56, Ida might receive $100 in exchange for
issuing a ticket that entitles its bearer to receive $1,000 (from Ida, or from whoever would have
previously had to pay Ida) upon the occurrence of R.
58. It is also important to clarify that the terms “event-enhancing” and “event-detracting”
(and the associated figures in this Section) refer only to the alteration in consequences
associated with event R, not to the expected value payment that was paid or received to bring it
about.
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the REVE is (from Ida’s perspective) event-enhancing or eventdetracting. But the direction in which the REVE payment flows is not
the only important dimension along which transactions can be
classified. Suppose Ida makes an expected value payment to improve
the consequences attaching to event R. Depending on what R
represents, that improvement might take any of the forms
59
schematically shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Event Enhancements

First, as shown in Figure 1(a), Ida might be purchasing
protection against the risk of loss from her current baseline, as with
fire insurance. Her expected value payment gives her the right to
receive a sum that will offset a loss delivered up by nature; the payoff
60
will fill in a ditch that this event will leave in her wealth. Second, as
shown in Figure 1(b), Ida might make an expected value payment to
61
buy a chance at an upside gain, as with a lottery ticket. Third, as
shown in Figure 1(c), Ida might purchase a blended product with her
expected value payment, as implicitly occurs under a products liability
regime featuring punitive damages. As commentators have noted,
punitive damage multipliers effectively force consumers to purchase
62
lottery tickets along with their products or services. In such cases,
59. The possibilities depicted in the figures in this Section are not exhaustive. In addition to
many intermediate cases between those shown, REVEs might intensify rather than offset
above- or below-baseline impacts already associated with R. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 1,
at 218–21 (explaining how anti-insurance contracts could allow two parties to a joint endeavor
to raise the stakes they collectively hold in it); infra note 153 and accompanying text.
60. What constitutes a “ditch” in this context is not always straightforward. See infra text
accompanying notes 68–70.
61. Such a pure gamble falls somewhat outside the core concerns of this Article, but it
offers an intuitive image of an above-baseline REVE.
62. See Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its
Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2230 (1999) (“In effect, the introduction of a multiplier

FENNELL IN FINAL.DOC

1302

3/2/2011 1:22:40 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1285

the expected value payment made as part of a consumer’s purchase
entitles her both to payments that will “backfill” her injuries and to a
chance at additional “gravy.”
A similar range of possibilities exists when Ida receives an
expected value payment in exchange for accepting unfavorable
consequences if R occurs. As shown in Figure 2, this trade may leave
her vulnerable to an unfilled ditch, as shown in 2(a), may merely
expose her to the loss of a possible gain, as in 2(b), or may do a bit of
both, as shown in 2(c).
Figure 2. Event Detractions

Given the conceptual symmetry between the event-enhancing
and event-detracting sides of REVEs, it is noteworthy that individual
consumers and households have limited opportunities to engage in
63
explicit event-detracting REVEs, even though explicit eventenhancing REVEs (insurance and lotteries) are familiar features of
the economic landscape. The explanation cannot be that society is
simply unwilling to allow people to be exposed to ditches. People are
allowed to remain uninsured against many risks that could
dramatically reduce their well-being. Indeed, they are routinely
turns the liability component of the price into a lottery ticket, with a bigger price up front
supporting the chance of a bigger payoff at the end.”); see also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 211–
12 (2008) (“[P]atients are effectively forced to buy a kind of lottery ticket, one that might be
worth anything from millions of dollars to nothing . . . .”). Thaler and Sunstein’s use of the
lottery metaphor includes a focus on erratic jury verdicts and variability in awards and hence
has been criticized for suggesting the adjudication process is a random one. Tom Baker &
Timothy D. Lytton, Essay, Allowing Patients to Waive the Right to Sue for Medical Malpractice:
A Response to Thaler and Sunstein, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 233, 248–49 (2010). But the metaphor,
as I use it here, would apply to punitive damages even if the tort system operated with perfect
accuracy and consistency; such awards would still attach a positive outcome to a stochastic
event—the injury itself—in a manner akin to tacking a lottery payout onto event R.
63. For some exceptions, see infra Part II.
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allowed to engage in transactions that contain event-detracting
64
REVEs embedded within them. As Figure 2 illustrates, moreover,
event-detracting REVEs can involve selling chances at lucky gains, as
65
well as selling coverage of unlucky losses. This last point is
taxonomically crucial and points to a second way of dividing REVEs.
2. Upside and Downside Risk. As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate,
knowing the direction in which the expected value payment flows
reveals only whether a given REVE is event-enhancing or eventdetracting from a given individual’s perspective; it does not indicate
whether that REVE moves the individual above or below a given
baseline. For the same reason, event-detracting REVEs do not
necessarily increase risk. One event-detracting REVE may increase
the variance in possible outcomes by letting a ditch stand unfilled in
one state of the world, but another may instead reduce the variance in
possible outcomes by eliminating the chance of a lucky gain.
Similarly, event-enhancing REVEs may either increase variance by
boosting consequences from a baseline state of the world or decrease
variance by delivering a payment that offsets a potential loss.
Of course, the baselines depicted in Figures 1 and 2 are
malleable, and the question of whether some event leaves one with a
ditch or merely fails to generate gravy is open to interpretation and
66
sensitive to framing. For example, suppose a worker purchases
wage-replacement insurance that will pay out at an escalating annual
rate designed to match her anticipated future wage trajectory in the
event that she loses her capacity to continue in her present job. Has
this worker insured against a loss or gambled for a gain? The answer
depends on whether the relevant baseline features no future salary
payments at all, salary payments that continue indefinitely at present

64. This occurs, for example, whenever an individual accepts a less safe product or service
at a lower price, takes a less safe job at a higher wage, or gives up a variable future income
stream in exchange for a more certain one through an employment contract.
65. See Kades, supra note 1, at 1496–1501 (examining the potential for the ex ante transfer
of chances at windfalls through reverse insurance or a societal equivalent). Governmental
mandates can produce the same risk endstate as a voluntary transaction to cede upside chances.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 915 (9th ed. 2008)
(describing “split-award” statutes that require some fraction of punitive-damages awards to be
paid to the state); Christine Hurt, The Windfall Myth, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 339, 342 n.12
(2010) (discussing Georgia’s statutory provision reassigning 75 percent of punitive-damage
awards to the state).
66. For a classic exploration of framing, see Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 29.

FENNELL IN FINAL.DOC

1304

3/2/2011 1:22:40 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1285

levels, salary payments that escalate over time in accordance with the
67
worker’s projected earning profile, or some other earnings pattern.
Another ambiguity is whether baseline states (and moves from
them) should be defined in terms of utility or wealth. Not all losses
68
that negatively affect utility negatively affect wealth. Choosing the
right metric requires deciding why the distinction between upside and
downside risk matters. As discussed below, low wealth levels may
lead to claims on societal resources, making unremediated “money
69
ditches” a matter of particular concern. Conversely, because
standard economic theory dictates that it is irrational to insure against
70
utility drops that do not increase the marginal utility of money,
society may justifiably pay less attention to utility ditches. As a
descriptive matter, however, even utility ditches that do not increase
the marginal utility of money may be framed as losses against which
protection is sought by risk-averse individuals, whether for
71
consolation reasons or otherwise.
Despite these complications, it remains helpful to add a second
distinction that crosscuts the event-enhancing/event-detracting
dichotomy outlined above. Some REVEs deal in downside or ditch
risk, like those shown in Figures 1(a) and 2(a), and other REVEs deal
in upside or gravy risk, like those shown in Figures 1(b) and 2(b).
Putting the two distinctions together as shown in Figure 3 reveals that
72
an individual can use REVEs to engage in four basic moves.

67. One complicating factor is the likelihood that earning the projected income in the
uninjured state requires work that is time consuming and potentially aversive, as well as other
expenditures to support the working lifestyle.
68. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 2, at 388–89 (distinguishing “wealth impacting” from
“wealth neutral” losses); supra text accompanying notes 33–35.
69. See infra Part III.B.1.
70. See, e.g., Zeckhauser, supra note 30, at 157 (stating that insuring against situations in
which utility is low “is desirable only if the marginal utility of money is higher in the low-utility
situation”); sources cited supra notes 33–35.
71. For discussion of such motivations, see supra text accompanying notes 37–40. The
relevance of cognitive framing to decisionmaking is explored in, for example, Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 29.
72. The examples provided in the cells of Figure 3 are tailored to fit an individual’s
perspective, but parties taking the other sides of these REVEs (insurers, reverse insurers,
manufacturers, and so on) also engage in these same basic moves.
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Figure 3. Four Basic Moves (Individual’s Perspective)
Risk Type

Downside “Ditch” Risk

Upside “Gravy” Risk

Expected
Value (EV) Payment
Individual Pays EV

I. Ditch Coverage

III. Gravy Gamble

Buying a Claim to Coverage
of Losses (e.g., Insurance)

Buying a Chance at a Gain
(e.g., Lottery Ticket)

Event-Enhancing

Reduces Downside Risk

Increases Upside Risk

Individual Receives EV

II. Ditch Exposure

IV. Gravy Giveup

Selling One’s Claim to
Coverage of Losses (e.g.,
Unmatured Tort Claim)

Selling One’s Chance at a Gain
(e.g., Nobel Prize Winnings)

Increases Downside Risk

Reduces Upside Risk

Event-Detracting

The four intuitive moves shown in Figure 3 map onto the buying
73
and writing of call and put options —transactions that are routinely
74
and symmetrically used by business entities to rearrange risk.
Although these same four logical possibilities are theoretically open
to individuals, actual risk-trading opportunities are far more limited.
Individuals regularly shed downside risk by purchasing ditch coverage
like insurance (cell I), and take on upside risk by engaging in gravy
75
gambles like buying lottery tickets (cell III). Less familiarly, an
individual who is already covered by insurance or by societal
arrangements that spread risk might engage in a ditch-exposure
transaction (cell II)—receiving money in exchange for accepting
76
exposure to those risks. Likewise, an individual might engage in a
73. Specifically, cell I equates to buying a put option, cell III equates to buying a call
option, cell II equates to writing a put option, and cell IV equates to writing a call option. A
similar four-square depiction of calls and puts (with layout differences) appears in ROBERT
TOMPKINS, OPTIONS EXPLAINED 14 tbl.1.2 (1991). I thank Michael Knoll and other participants
at Columbia’s law and economics workshop for discussions on these parallels.
74. I do not mean to suggest that calls and puts enable entities to perfectly hedge all risks in
all contexts, only that they offer useful and ubiquitous platforms for attempting to do so.
75. See KENNETH J. ARROW, Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in RiskTaking Situations, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING, supra note 7, at 1, 4–6
(discussing the examples of gambling and insurance, as well as other phenomena that involve
uncertainty less directly or obviously).
76. This move is well captured by the phrase “reverse insurance,” but that moniker has also
been applied to cell IV (gravy-giveup) transactions. See Kades, supra note 1, at 1492 (using
“reverse insurance” to designate a “private market mechanism for redistributing windfalls”).
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gravy-giveup transaction (cell IV)—selling off her claim to a chance
at a gain that might be delivered by law, policy, effort, or nature.
Although chances at true “windfalls” represent one incarnation of
77
these claims, cell IV transactions might also involve claims to
positive outcomes that are the product of merit or effort (selling one’s
chance at winning the Nobel Prize, or a share of one’s future earnings
78
in some creative or athletic pursuit).
Hybrid transactions that draw from both of the columns in
Figure 3 are also possible. As illustrated by Figures 1(c) and 2(c),
people often hold rights to payments that are triggered by losses, but
that do more than cover those losses. For example, if one were to sell
one’s unmatured tort claim in its entirety, this would involve both a
shedding of upside risk and an acceptance of downside risk—
although the ditch and gravy components of such transactions might
79
be disaggregated. Hybrid transactions can also combine ditch
coverage with a gravy giveup, as where an individual sells rights to the
future appreciation of her home, using part of the proceeds to
80
purchase protection against downside home-value risk. Similarly,
ditch exposure might be combined with a gravy gamble in a
transaction that amplifies both upside and downside risk. Consider,
for example, an employee who accepts a higher risk of job loss in
exchange for a higher salary (ditch exposure) but who funnels that
additional money into options in the company that will enable her to
share in its upside returns (gravy gamble). In this case, the expected
value payment that the individual receives for taking on more
exposure would help fund the upside claim she purchases.

Similarly, the term “anti-insurance” has been applied to both ditch-exposure and gravy-gamble
transactions. See generally Cooter & Porat, supra note 1 (discussing anti-insurance for losses and
for gains). Because many kinds of transactions can be viewed as constituting the opposite of
insurance along some dimension, Figure 3’s taxonomic labels will be employed throughout the
Article to add precision.
77. See Kades, supra note 1, at 1491 (defining “windfalls as economic gains independent of
work, planning, or other productive activities that society wishes to reward” (emphasis
omitted)); see also Hurt, supra note 65, at 349–77 (providing a taxonomy of windfalls and
analyzing the use of the word).
78. See infra Part II.D.
79. For example, it would be possible for parties to selectively sell portions of their
unmatured tort claims, or selectively replace portions of the alienated coverage with first-party
insurance. E.g., Cooter, supra note 2, at 384–85, 387.
80. See infra Part II.C.1. Financial “collars” that combine a call and a put to narrow the
possible range of returns are a familiar example of a hybrid transaction combining cells I and
IV.
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C. Triangular Risk Configurations
So far, I have examined REVEs from the perspective of an
individual without considering the identity of the counterparty.
REVEs can pass risk back and forth between two parties to a risky
interaction, such as a potential victim and a potential injurer. But as
the AYOR and NAYOR examples in the Introduction suggest, a
previously uninvolved third party could also transfer risk in either
direction. The involvement of such an insurer or reverse insurer
facilitates additional arrangements in which both original parties to a
81
given transaction are effectively insured against, or exposed to, risk.
To reach the “both-insured” state, the party that the law has left
exposed to the risk must procure insurance. If losses are left to fall on
the injurer, the injurer can obtain third-party insurance to cover those
losses. If losses are left to fall on the victim, the victim can obtain
first-party insurance. The potential advantages of the “both-insured”
endstate are fairly intuitive: both parties to an interaction may be risk
82
averse or may have other reasons for wishing to carry insurance.
To reach the “both-exposed” state, the party that the law has
effectively insured against the risk must engage in a ditch-exposure
83
transaction. Thus, if the law places losses on injurers, prospective
victims could sell their potential claims and accept exposure to any
84
actual losses they may suffer. Likewise, if the law leaves the loss on
victims, potential injurers could agree to pay a third-party reverse
insurer amounts keyed to the losses actually suffered by the victims in
exchange for an expected value payment from the reverse insurer. By
making side bets with one of the parties, the reverse insurer brings
about an endstate in which losses effectively fall both on victims and
85
on injurers. That such a both-exposed regime can enhance efficiency
81. I will focus here on third parties who enter the picture as insurers or reverse insurers.
Another possibility, which I do not discuss, would be for the law to place liability on unrelated
third parties as a default matter, thus inducing them to initiate deals with the parties who are in
a better position to control accidents. See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 136 (considering the
implications of assigning the loss of car-pedestrian accidents to “an arbitrary third party, e.g.,
television manufacturers”).
82. For a recent discussion of why risk-neutral corporations nonetheless buy insurance, see
generally Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance,
5 REV. L. & ECON. 541 (2009).
83. See supra Figure 2(a) and accompanying text.
84. See infra Part II.B.1.
85. The textual discussion assumes that victims and injurers are not able to collude with
each other. An incentive for collusion exists because third-party reverse insurance makes the
victim and the injurer collectively responsible for twice the loss, whereas their collective
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has been intriguingly analyzed by Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat,
and follows from Cooter’s earlier explorations of “double
87
responsibility at the margin.” By driving a wedge between what the
injurer pays and what the victim receives, reverse insurance restores
incentives that might otherwise be dulled by a legal system that
88
assigns the loss to only one of the parties.
Such triangular arrangements are important to a discussion of
risk unbundling for at least three reasons. First, risk must be
disaggregated from underlying consumption and activity choices
before it can be transacted over with a third party. Thus, triangular
arrangements—and the advantages they uniquely produce—depend
upon unbundling. Second, triangular risk configurations can help
89
address some concerns associated with REVEs. The counterintuitive
implication is that objections to risk transactions can sometimes be
met by expanding, rather than contracting, opportunities to transact
over risks. Third, contemplating the possibility of triangular
arrangements sharply raises important supply-side questions. On one
hand, there are practical and legal impediments that could limit the
90
interest and participation of third-party risk merchants. On the
other, certain regulatory constraints may be required for novel risk91
management products offered by third parties.
exposure to the loss in the absence of the reverse insurer is half that amount. For example,
suppose victim A is injured after assigning her claim to reverse insurer C in a world in which B
would ordinarily be liable to A. If A and B can keep C from learning about the injury, B can pay
A some positive amount that is less than what he would ordinarily have to pay on the claim, and
both will be better off. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 1, at 215–16 (discussing this and other
collusion risks associated with anti-insurance).
86. Although Cooter and Porat focus primarily on the contract context, they briefly
explore how their ideas might apply to torts. Id. at 225–26.
87. Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1985) (describing an efficiency condition in which both parties capable of
taking precautions against a given harm are made fully responsible for that harm); see also
Coase, supra note 9, at 41 (suggesting a “double tax system” that would impose charges on both
parties to a land-use dispute).
88. The law could, of course, delink collections from injurers and payments to victims,
whether to reach a “both exposed” state or for other reasons. See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at
22–23 (arguing against the notion “that there is any necessary financial link between injurers
and victims”).
89. See infra Part IV.B.2.
90. For a discussion of some of these considerations, see Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note
19, at 98–110, and see also infra Part III.
91. Among other things, it would be possible to place limits on the ability of those
accepting certain risks to further unbundle and resell those risks where this is deemed necessary
to preserve the right risk assessment and pricing incentives. Cutting against this regulatory
impulse is the need for thick markets in risk, which free alienability would help to foster. Other
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II. REVES, REAL AND IMAGINED
The basic moves identified above can be combined in numerous
ways to form REVEs that range from the ubiquitous to the exotic.
Insurance and lotteries are familiar REVEs and, at least when offered
explicitly, are easy to identify. But many REVEs occur, or might
occur, outside of these contexts. Risks are of course pervasively
92
shifted through the stock market. Contractual arrangements also
inevitably allocate risk, whether through default rules or through
93
shifts from them. Examples of less familiar REVEs for modifying
personal and household risks—some of which have been
implemented or proposed—follow. The list is not comprehensive but
merely suggestive of the range of possibilities. Because this Part
focuses on illustrating risk rearrangements rather than on evaluating
them, the brief descriptions here do not attempt to catalogue—much
less address—the many considerations that would bear on the
normative desirability or feasibility of these instruments.
A. Matters of Life and Death
Life insurance and annuities, transactions that might be viewed
from the individual’s perspective as constituting either ditch coverage
94
or gravy gambles, are the most familiar ways to address life-anddeath risk. But other possibilities exist. For example, viatical and life
settlements permit a terminally ill or elderly holder of a life insurance
95
policy to sell the right to receive the proceeds of that policy for an
restrictions might serve to counter cognitive biases, reduce information asymmetries between
the parties, address problems of fraud and collusion, and so on.
92. See ARROW, supra note 7, at 138–39 (noting shortcomings in the stock market’s riskshifting capacities). Although derivatives and other vehicles for slicing and repackaging risk
have addressed some of the gaps that Arrow identified, these devices have suffered from
implementation problems of their own, as the recent financial crisis illustrates.
93. See id. at 136–37 (noting that to the extent contracts involve the future, they always
involve risk); see also Korobkin, supra note 18, at 619–21 (discussing some reasons why efficient
risk-shifting away from a contractual default may fail to occur); Korobkin, supra note 18, at 633–
64 (presenting results of an experiment designed to test the status quo bias as it applies to
contract default terms, including those governing consequential damages and impossibility).
94. Which cell to slot the arrangement into depends on whether the loss of life (or, in the
case of annuities, longevity) will create the kind of ditch to which money can respond, or
whether the proceeds instead represent a kind of gravy that leaves the recipient better off in
monetary terms. See, e.g., IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946) (featuring a distraught
George Bailey who takes to heart Mr. Potter’s assessment that he is “worth more dead than
alive”).
95. “Viatical settlement” refers to the sale of a life insurance policy by a terminally ill
person, whereas “life settlement” or “senior settlement” refers to the sale of a life insurance
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96

immediate lump sum. From the policyholder’s perspective, these
97
transactions correspond to either ditch exposure or gravy giveups.
Another life-and-death REVE is the tontine, a form of life insurance
that bestows deferred dividends on individuals who survive beyond a
set period, paid from the premiums that policyholders as a group
98
contribute. Freestanding bets on one’s own survival to a date certain
99
are also possible; these transactions might be viewed as constituting
either ditch coverage or gravy gambles.
Steven Croley and Jon Hanson discuss a transaction that would
arguably amount to a gravy giveup: “disinsurance,” in which parents
would receive a lump sum upon the birth of a child but take on the
obligation to make a much larger payment to the disinsurer in the
100
event that the child dies before the age of eighteen. As the authors
explain, the fact that parents typically experience lower financial
burdens after a child dies amounts to a kind of implicit life insurance
carried on the child; the death comes bundled not with an explicit
payout from an insurer, but with significant cost savings that amount
policy by a senior citizen. Jessica Maria Perez, Note, You Can Bet Your Life on It! Regulating
Senior Settlements to Be a Financial Alternative for the Elderly, 10 ELDER L.J. 425, 430 (2002).
96. Id. at 428–29. The investor also pays any remaining premiums that come due on the
policy. Id. The financial crisis has heightened demand for these transactions. Jennifer Hodson,
Clients Cash in Policies—Life-Settlement Industry Sees Growth as People Seek Funds, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009, at B5A. Although these mechanisms have been criticized, the fact that they
allow an investor to profit from an individual’s death does not distinguish them from annuities.
Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 41 (2007).
97. Again, the classification depends on what the effect of the forgone proceeds would
have been. See supra note 94.
98. Tontines, named for Lorenzo de Tonti, have taken a variety of forms throughout
history but always grant their shareholders some benefit by virtue of survival. See Kent
McKeever, A Short History of Tontines, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 491 (2009). In its
most dramatic incarnation, group members contributed to a fund that went to the last individual
to survive. Id.; see also ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, THE WRONG BOX (1889) (featuring a plot
involving such a tontine). A form of tontine life insurance that paid out for survival as well as
for death evolved in the United States in the nineteenth century. Tom Baker & Peter
Siegelman, Tontines for the Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks into the Health-Insurance Pool with
an Idea from Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 79, 85–88;
McKeever, supra, at 507. Tom Baker and Peter Siegelman propose adapting the tontines idea of
deferred dividends to the health insurance arena. See generally Baker & Siegelman, supra.
99. See, e.g., Dying Man Wins Bet He Would Live, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/england/beds/bucks/herts/8075288.stm (last updated May 30, 2009, 14:39 GMT)
(reporting on a cancer patient who collected £5,000 on each of two bets that he would live to a
certain date); see also Rachael Emma Silverman, Letting an Investor Bet on When You’ll Die,
WALL ST. J., May 26, 2005, at D1 (describing an approach to financing life insurance in which
investors may end up owning the policy if the insured survives beyond a two-year loan period).
100. Croley & Hanson, supra note 1, at 1885; see also id. at 1885 n.367 (discussing variations
on this idea, including an annuity that pays out only if the child survives to the age of eighteen).
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101

to the same thing. If the money that becomes newly available after a
child’s death carries lower marginal utility than would money
available while the child is alive, there is an efficiency argument for
moving money from the state of the world in which the child is dead
102
to the state of the world in which the child is alive. On one view, at
least, such a move amounts to selling gravy in the state of the world in
which the child has died, where the bounty will be less appealing.
A related idea, recently explored by Ariel Porat and Avraham
103
Tabbach, would enable an individual to reverse insure her own life.
A reverse insurer would offer the following deal to an individual
facing some risk of death: if you live, I will pay you the expected value
of your wealth remaining after your death, and if you die, I will
104
receive your wealth. This approach allows an individual, while
living, to access wealth that exists only in the state of the world in
105
which she has died. The opportunity to enter into such contracts
also carries the potential to realign incentives that are skewed as a
result of the undervaluing of wealth after death, a point that connects
to questions about health care and related end-of-life
106
decisionmaking.
B. Legal Claims and Liabilities
1. Selling (and Settling) Legal Claims.
Legal claims are
effectively sold whenever the parties to a lawsuit (or potential
lawsuit) settle among themselves; for plaintiffs, these transactions
typically combine ditch coverage with a gravy giveup by
simultaneously truncating upside and downside risk. Liability waivers,
which may be viewed as combining ditch exposure with a gravy
101. See id. at 1885.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 29–35; see also Croley & Hanson, supra note 1, at
1885 (suggesting that the unavailability of markets in this form of disinsurance offers some
evidence that parents prefer the implicit insurance against the death of a child that inheres in
the cost savings accruing to parents following such a death).
103. Ariel Porat & Avraham Tabbach, Risk of Death, AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 16–20), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669652.
104. Id. at 16–17.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 16 (arguing that reverse insurance would make an individual “fully internalize
all the costs and benefits of his investment in self-risk reduction”); see also infra text
accompanying note 173. The authors make the simplifying assumption that wealth holds no
value for a person after her death, but a similar analysis would apply even if people had bequest
motives, as long as they still valued wealth more during life. Porat & Tabbach, supra note 103, at
36.
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107

giveup, also represent a familiar (if often legally unavailable)
vehicle for reversing tort law’s default risk allocation between
108
potential injurers and potential victims. But legal risks could also be
addressed through REVEs that involve third parties and that
encompass transactions that occur prior to any point of injury or
109
exposure. For example, a number of scholars have advocated
110
markets in unmatured tort claims. These proposals contemplate the
sale of potential claims to third parties who would be entitled to
111
collect on behalf of the victim in the event he is injured. Advocates
of markets in unmatured tort claims have typically prescribed specific
limits on these transactions, such as a requirement that potential

107. See supra text accompanying note 62.
108. For a recent discussion of liability waivers and the legal limitations on them, see Mark
A. Geistfeld, The Value of Consumer Choice in Products Liability, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 800
(2009); and see also Richard C. Ausness, “Waive” Goodbye to Tort Liability: A Proposal to
Remove Paternalism from Product Sales Transactions, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 293, 294 (2000);
and Note, Enforcing Waivers in Products Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (1983). For a
recent economic analysis of the effects of products liability waivers, see Albert Choi & Kathryn
E. Spier, Should Consumers Be Permitted to Waive Products Liability? Product Safety, Private
Contracts, and Adverse Selection 1 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 2010-11, 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1680932.
109. Transactions could also occur between the point of exposure and the manifestation of
harm. See Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort
Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1435, 1474–75 & n.183 (2004) (discussing asbestos exposure as
presenting “inchoate claims,” the settlement of which would constitute a form of “antiinsurance”); see also Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Future Harm, in PERSPECTIVES ON
CAUSATION (Richard S. Goldberg ed., forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 26–27), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457362 (proposing that victims be allowed to choose compensation for
future harm over compensation for realized harm, in part because this would enable them to
make use of money in a state of the world in which they are healthy).
110. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW
COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 202–10 (1989);
Robert Cooter & Stephen D. Sugarman, A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort Claims: Tort
Reform by Contract, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 174 (Walter Olsen ed., 1988);
Cooter, supra note 2; Shukaitis, supra note 2; Sugarman, supra note 2. For critiques, see Charles
J. Goetz, Commentary on “Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims”: Collateral
Implications, 75 VA. L. REV. 413 (1989); Alan Schwartz, Commentary on “Towards a Market in
Unmatured Tort Claims”: A Long Way Yet to Go, 75 VA. L. REV. 423 (1989).
111. This does not necessarily mean that the purchaser would actually end up pursuing a
claim if an injury later occurred. For example, some proposals contemplate that the unmatured
claims would be purchased by employers and resold in blocks to potential injurers and their
insurers, thus “presettling” large numbers of potential claims. See SUGARMAN, supra note 110,
at 202–03; Cooter & Sugarman, supra note 110, at 176; see also Jeffrey O’Connell, Harnessing
the Liability Lottery: Elective First-Party No-Fault Insurance Financed by Third-Party Tort
Claims, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 693, 699–700 (noting the potential for two insurance companies
holding tort claims of their insureds to engage in a “bulk settlement of all mutual claims”).
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victims first secure adequate first-party insurance. The initial sale of
the tort claim would combine ditch exposure with a gravy giveup, but
the purchase of first-party insurance would undo the ditch-exposure
component with a ditch-coverage move.
Although scholarship on unmatured tort claims focuses on
transactions involving potential plaintiffs, it would also be possible for
potential defendants to engage in parallel transactions from a
baseline in which they are shielded from liability. Suppose that the
law placed losses by default not on specific injurers, but instead
spread the risk of loss more broadly through a social insurance system
113
funded by contributions from all potential injurers. In such a
regime, a potential injurer might wish to make a deal in which it
receives from the social insurer (or a third-party reverse insurer) a
payment equal to the expected value of the injuries it will cause,
agreeing in exchange to pay an amount equal to the losses that it (the
114
potential injurer) actually ends up inflicting on the victim. This
would be a ditch-exposure move.
After the event giving rise to liability occurs and a (matured)
legal claim exists, litigation risk remains that both plaintiffs and
115
defendants might transact over with third parties. REVEs might
112. See SUGARMAN, supra note 110, at 204; Cooter, supra note 2, at 401–02; Cooter &
Sugarman, supra note 110, at 178. An earlier proposal by Jeffrey O’Connell framed the sale of
unmatured tort claims as a way to finance first-party no-fault insurance. O’Connell, supra note
111, at 697–98; see also Jeffrey O’Connell & Janet Beck, Overcoming Legal Barriers to the
Transfer of Third-Party Tort Claims as a Means of Financing First-Party No-Fault Insurance, 58
WASH. U. L.Q. 55, 55–56 (1980). Insurance subrogation represents an existing, limited way in
which certain tort claim rights are transferred in exchange for less expensive first-party
insurance covering the same risks. I thank Frank Easterbrook for raising this point.
113. New Zealand’s system fits this model. A government agency, the Accident
Compensation Corporation, provides “no fault” coverage to accident victims, drawing on
accounts funded by various taxes and levies. See Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 190 (2008); ACC, http://www.acc.co.nz/index.htm (last visited Jan.
23, 2011).
114. Like reverse insurance procured by potential victims in a regime that holds injurers
liable, this arrangement produces exposure for both parties. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 1,
at 225; supra text accompanying notes 83–88.
115. For analysis of the potential for markets in legal claims and associated litigation risk,
see generally Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697
(2005); Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009).
Transactions in which investors fund lawsuits in exchange for some of the proceeds have
become increasingly prevalent. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Putting Money on Lawsuits,
Investors Share in the Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A1; Nate Raymond, Attorneys
Explore Third-Party Funding in Commercial Disputes, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 2010, at 1; Jonathan D.
Glater, Investing in Lawsuits, for a Share of the Awards, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2009, at B1. Other
risks associated with payouts from legal claims can also be shifted. See, e.g., Adam F. Scales,
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also occur after final judgment to alter the risk allocation embedded
in the relief awarded, as explained below.
2. Tort Remedies. The use of damages to remedy a nuisance
represents an interesting example of a risk allocation embedded
within a legal outcome. Suppose the law entitles a homeowner to be
free of smoke emanating from a neighboring factory, but protects that
116
entitlement only with a liability rule. If stochastic factors determine
whether and to what extent the emissions of the factory translate into
117
realized harm for the homeowner, then risk is allocated differently
if the homeowner is compensated for realized harm than if she is
118
compensated ex ante for expected harm.
Suppose a legal regime initially permits the homeowner to collect
based on realized harm, but allows her to trade that claim for an
upfront payment of permanent damages from the defendant. From
the homeowner’s perspective, this transaction represents an eventdetracting move that detaches compensation from the realization of
harm (ditch exposure). For the defendant, the trade amounts to an
event enhancement that detaches liability from an otherwise covered
event (a ditch-coverage move). Alternatively, a legal regime might
begin at this endpoint, with permanent damages as the default
remedy. In that case, the defendant might take on risk (ditch
119
exposure) either by selling coverage directly to the plaintiff or by
negotiating with a third-party reverse insurer. Similarly, the plaintiff
might shed risk in such a world by purchasing ditch coverage either
Against Settlement Factoring? The Market in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859,
897–900 (describing settlement factoring transactions, which involve selling rights to payout
streams from tort settlements); Peter Lattman & Diana B. Henriques, Speculators Are Eager to
Bet on Madoff Claims, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Dec. 13, 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2010/12/13/speculators-are-eager-to-bet-on-madoff-claims (noting the longstanding existence of
markets for trading in bankruptcy claims and reporting on trades in the Madoff case).
116. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1092, 1115–16 (distinguishing liability rules
from property rules in the nuisance context).
117. For example, chance weather patterns, including wind speed and direction, may greatly
affect the impacts associated with effluents. Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets
and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional
Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 578, 580 (2001).
118. See Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1468–69 (2007)
(distinguishing between liability rules that shift the costs of realized harm and those that impose
liability based on expected harm); cf. Cooter, supra note 87, at 14–19 (discussing invariant
damages in the contract context).
119. “Selling coverage” in this context means that the defendant retains the permanent
damages that she would otherwise pay to the plaintiff and agrees in exchange to cover any
actual harm from her activities that materializes.
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directly from the defendant or from an insurer. If the conferral of
120
positive externalities could give rise to liability, gravy-gamble and
gravy-giveup transactions paralleling those detailed above could
121
likewise rearrange the law’s default allocation of upside risk.
3. Legal Changes. People may be interested in insuring against
or hedging legal changes that would significantly affect their lives.
Prediction markets keyed to tax-law changes and other legislative
122
changes have already emerged. Scholarship has also examined the
123
potential for private insurance against governmental takings.
Policies offered by the World Bank Group’s Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency represent another tool for managing the risk of
legal change, insuring investors against certain governmental acts and
124
omissions, as well as against war and civil unrest. To the extent the
change in question is one that will have a negative financial impact on
the individual seeking insurance, the transaction amounts to ditch
coverage. It would also be possible for people to increase upside risk
by betting on changes that will not affect them at all, or that will
benefit them (gravy gambles). Alternatively, when uncertain legal

120. For a recent article detailing the existing limits on liability for unrequested benefits and
proposing an “expanded duty of restitution,” see Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public
Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2009).
121. Suppose a legal regime makes neighbor A liable for part of the cost of a fence
constructed by neighbor B if that fence bestows benefits on A. That liability might be
operationalized in either of the following ways: (1) neighbor A might be required to pay when
an appraisal upon resale establishes that value has been added, or (2) A might be required to
pay upfront for the expected value added. The former arrangement leaves B with the risk that
the benefits will not materialize, whereas the latter places that risk on A. Either arrangement
could be reversed using gravy-gamble or gravy-giveup REVEs.
122. See INTRADE PREDICTION MARKETS, http://www.intrade.com (search for “tax” and
“cap and trade”) (last visited Feb. 5, 2011) (listing contracts for changes in U.S. tax rates and for
the establishment of a cap-and-trade system); see also Jason Ruspini, Tax Futures “In Real
Life,” RISK MARKETS & POL. (Feb. 6, 2008, 11:55 PM), http://riskmarkets.blogspot.com/2008/02/
tax-futures-reality.html (discussing the introduction of tax futures on Intrade.com).
123. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just
Compensation” Be Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
451, 499–521 (2003); Eric Kades, Avoiding Takings “Accidents”: A Torts Perspective on Takings
Law, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1238–47, 1270–72 (1994); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 527–28, 537–49, 602–06 (1986).
124. See Types of Coverage, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTY AGENCY, http://
www.miga.org/guarantees/index_sv.cfm?stid=1547 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011) (offering insurance
against expropriation, including “creeping” expropriation, against governmental acts or
omissions that make it impossible to convert or transfer currency, and against losses from
“[w]ar, terrorism, and civil disturbance”). I thank Nicole Garnett for alerting me to these
policies.
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changes would have a positive effect, that effect could be dampened
by selling rights to part or all of that potential gain (gravy giveup).
Transition relief—such as grandfathering, recognition of vested
rights, or compensation for governmental takings—amounts to
125
embedded insurance against legal change. Following the logic of
unbundling, some people might wish to shed the implicit insurance
provided by the law by receiving the expected value equivalent of
that relief from the government—perhaps in the form of lower taxes
or less onerous land-use exactions—in exchange for greater exposure
126
to the effects of future legal changes. This would represent a ditchexposure transaction, assuming the legal change would in fact inflict
losses.
C. Homes
1. Housing Futures and Options. By default, the law leaves
homeowners exposed to volatility in home values, most of which is
governed by factors beyond their personal control. As a growing
number of scholars, policymakers, and entrepreneurs have observed,
127
many homeowners could benefit from offloading some of this risk.
There is both an upside and a downside component of home-value
variance, as measured against the baseline of the original sales price,
and each component could be separately adjusted. First, a
homeowning household could purchase protection against downward
128
price movements in the local housing market. This would be a form
125. See, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE 40–42 (2000); Lawrence Blume &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569,
571–72 (1984); Kaplow, supra note 123, at 527–28. See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan
Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2010)
(discussing the potential role of government-provided transition relief in light of the
unavailability of private insurance).
126. For example, a number of scholars have noted that the government could pay
landowners for “takings options” that would permit the government to condemn without paying
just compensation for improvements on the land. See, e.g., William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro,
Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just
Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 274 (1988) (describing this possibility and citing
antecedent literature).
127. For an overview of past, proposed, and existing programs and products for rearranging
homeownership risk, see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1047 (2008).
128. For an overview of the purposes and potential of home equity insurance, see generally
Robert J. Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, Home Equity Insurance, 19 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON.
21 (1999). Some localities have experimented with forms of home equity insurance. See, e.g.,
Maureen A. McNamara, The Legality and Efficacy of Homeowner’s Equity Assurance: A Study
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of ditch coverage that works like ordinary first-party insurance—the
homeowner pays out the expected value of any loss of home value
attributable to downward market fluctuations and receives in
exchange the right to an amount that will cover this loss in the event
of such fluctuations.
Alternatively, or in addition, a household could sell the right to
129
upside home appreciation. This event-detracting REVE could be
characterized as a gravy giveup if the original purchase price serves as
the baseline. Of course, it is possible to frame things differently. If the
homeowner will need to purchase other housing upon resale of the
current house, that need can be viewed as a liability; the price
increases in that other housing represent potential reductions in the
130
homeowner’s standard of living. If the homeowner’s present and
future homes experience closely correlated price movements, then
the appreciation realized on the current house would help cover the
131
threatened loss associated with price increases in the new house.
Selling the home’s upside potential in this context would seem more
like selling an insurance claim and accepting ditch exposure.
2. Rental Price Insurance. Because tenants lack an equity stake
in the properties in which they live, rising property values can lead to
affordability shortfalls as rents rise. Although the empirical record on
132
the extent of involuntary displacement is complex and contested,

of Oak Park, Illinois, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1463 (1984); Andrew Caplin, William Goetzmann, Eric
Hangen, Barry Nalebuff, Elisabeth Prentice, John Rodkin, Matthew Spiegel & Tom Skinner,
Home Equity Insurance: A Pilot Project (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 03-12,
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=410141.
129. This would enable a homeowner to finance her purchase using equity as well as debt.
See, e.g., Andrew Caplin, James H. Carr, Frederick Pollock & Zhong Yi Tong, with Kheng Mei
Tan & Trivikraman Thampy, Shared-Equity Mortgages, Housing Affordability, and
Homeownership, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 209, 217 (2007).
130. Sinai & Souleles, supra note 14, at 763 (observing that “all households are in effect
born ‘short’ housing services, since they have to live somewhere”).
131. See Todd M. Sinai & Nicholas S. Souleles, Can Owning a Home Hedge the Risk of
Moving? 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w15462, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498963 (finding that households “tend to move between highly
covarying housing markets,” which makes the purchase of the first home work as an effective
hedge against the second home).
132. Compare, e.g., Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, Gentrification and Displacement, New
York City in the 1990’s, 70 J. AM. PLANNING ASSOC. 39, 51 (2004) (“Our analysis indicates that
rather than speeding up the departure of low-income residents through displacement,
neighborhood gentrification in New York City was actually associated with a lower propensity
of disadvantaged households to move.”), with Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, The Right to
Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and Resistance to Displacement in New York City, 43 URBAN
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there is little doubt that fear of displacement and rising rental costs
generate disutility, both for tenants and for others in their
133
communities. These concerns would disappear if tenants could
obtain what homeowners already have—an option to remain in place
134
as long as they like at a fixed price. Lengthy leases are one
possibility, but these are costly for landlords to offer and often
unattractive to tenants who want to retain the option to leave if they
so choose. Some scholars have suggested that tenants be afforded
135
access to financial instruments indexed to area rents. Under such a
plan, the value of the instrument held by the tenant would rise if rents
136
rose, allowing her to afford the new, higher rent. Tenants would be
137
effectively insured against increased rents. This approach involves a
ditch-coverage REVE, albeit one that a governmental entity might
138
fund or subsidize.
STUD. 23, 30–31, 47–52 (2006) (discussing ways in which data on displacement may understate
the phenomenon and noting the role of housing policies such as rent regulation in mitigating
gentrification’s displacement effects).
133. For discussion of these effects, see, for example, Freeman & Braconi, supra note 132, at
39–40; and Newman & Wyly, supra note 132, at 30–31.
134. On the importance to tenants of the right to remain, see Margaret Jane Radin,
Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 359–63, 368–70 (1986); Florence Wagman
Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law Protections for Security of Tenure: An Essay in
Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 817, 820–29 (2008). The contrast between the
situations of tenants and homeowners is often less stark than the statement in the text might
suggest. For example, tenants in many localities enjoy some protection against displacement,
whereas some mortgage products, such as those with adjustable rates, undermine the usual price
protection associated with homeownership.
135. See, e.g., BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, CITY ECONOMICS 369 (2005) (“Tenants could get a
long-run stake in the community if they were required to buy some variety of security that was
pegged to the town’s or neighborhood’s total property value.”); Robert I. Lerman & SigneMary McKernan, Promoting Neighborhood Improvement While Protecting Low-Income
Families, OPPORTUNITY & OWNERSHIP PROJECT (Urban Inst., D.C.), May 2007, at 2, available
at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311457_Promoting_Neighborhood.pdf (proposing use of
a “tradable option” for tenants that “would be a financial asset linked to an index of area
rents”); Robert I. Lerman, Promoting Neighborhood Improvement While Protecting LowIncome Families 6–12 (Nov. 8, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the 29th Research
Conference, Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (expanding on the proposal for financial options for tenants); see also Lee Anne
Fennell & Julie Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143 (2010) (discussing
how local governments might make such instruments available to tenants).
136. Lerman & McKernan, supra note 135, at 2; Lerman, supra note 135, at 6.
137. Although one incarnation of the proposal would envision the use of financial
instruments (structured as call options) to deliver protection, the program could instead be
explicitly structured as an insurance program. Lerman & McKernan, supra note 135, at 2;
Lerman, supra note 135, at 7–8.
138. For example, local governments might subsidize such financial instruments or provide
them free of charge to low-income tenants. See Lerman & McKernan, supra note 135, at 3.
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It is also worth observing that rent control delivers a form of
legally embedded rental-price insurance that is tied to the
household’s specific unit. Recognizing this equivalence opens up the
possibility that some tenants in rent-controlled units might wish to sell
their implicit insurance, receiving a lump sum in exchange for greater
exposure to changes in local rental rates (a ditch-exposure
139
transaction).
D. Livelihoods and Human Capital
1. Equity Shares in Future Earnings. Minor league baseball
player Randy Newsom made the news in 2008 (and attracted
unwanted regulatory attention from the SEC) by setting up a website
140
to sell shares of his future major league earnings. A writer recently
141
tried a similar tactic, and one might imagine the idea taking hold
142
more broadly were it not for regulatory hurdles. Even people who
have regular salaries might want to sell a proportion of the proceeds
from a bonus, award, or promotion they stand some chance of
receiving. For example, an academic who is widely viewed as standing
a significant chance of winning the Nobel Prize might alienate the

139. See Radin, supra note 134, at 359–60 n.12 (observing that “[t]here could also be tenants
who would value the money they might get by ‘selling’ back to the landlord their rent-control
rights more than they value a right to keep their apartments,” but noting that actual rent-control
programs do not allow tenants to waive their rent-control rights in exchange for a lower initial
rent).
140. Alan Schwarz, Buying Low: Minor Leaguer Takes Stock of Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1, 2008, at D1. Newsom tabled his plan, see id., and is now attending law school at Boston
College, Tetanus Shots, Law School Anxieties, and Baseball Road Trips, AFTER THE NINTH
(Aug. 26, 2009), http://rnewsom.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/tetanus-shots-law-school-anxietiesand-baseball-road-trips.
141. When a Novelist Holds an IPO, FREAKONOMICS (Aug. 1, 2008, 1:02 PM), http://
freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/when-a-novelist-holds-an-ipo.
142. See Christine Hurt, One More Time: Selling Fractional Interests in Your Career or Your
Work Product Will Take You for a Ride Through Securities Law—Even if You Are an “Ant
Trading a Mote of Sand for a Leaf or Something,” THE CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 5, 2008),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/08/one-more-time-s.html (discussing regulatory issues).
Selling equity rights to a future income stream can be distinguished from using a future income
stream to secure a bond. A number of athletes, including White Sox player Frank Thomas, have
attempted to securitize guaranteed future income streams as a way of raising money. GIL
FRIED, STEVEN J. SHAPIRO & TIMOTHY D. DESCHRIVER, SPORT FINANCE 178 (2d ed. 2008).
“Bowie bonds” represented a similar effort at securitization, albeit one based on an income
stream that proved fickle. See Karen Richardson, Bankers Hope for a Reprise of “Bowie
Bonds,” WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2005, at C1.
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right to the proceeds from that prize in exchange for a sum certain.
These would represent gravy giveups.
Although the idea of selling stock in oneself seems novel, it
closely resembles familiar arrangements. Many firms heavily rely on
equity financing, and one might well ask why individuals should not
144
be able to do the same. A close parallel is found in recording or
publishing contracts. In the face of great uncertainty surrounding the
future payoff from creative works (which may or may not have yet
been created), artists and authors often effectively sell much of the
145
upside potential in exchange for a sure gain. That gain is paid partly
in the form of an advance on royalties, which effectively insures the
146
author against receiving an outcome below that benchmark, and
partly through the in-kind provision of production, distribution, and
147
publicity services. To the extent new production, distribution, and
publicity channels opened up by the Internet make the in-kind
component easier for artists to supply or contract for on their own,

143. Betting markets in prospective Nobel Prize awards have already developed. A New
Zealand company, iPredict, offered contracts on the 2010 Nobel Prize in Economics. Tyler
Cowen, Economic Nobel Odds at iPredict, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (Oct. 6, 2010, 7:58 AM),
http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2010/10/economics-nobel-odds-atipredict.html. Both 2009 winners of the Nobel in economics (Elinor Ostrom and Oliver
Williamson) were given 50:1 odds by a U.K.-based betting site, Ladbrokes. Greg Mankiw, Nobel
Odds, GREG MANKIW’S BLOG (Oct. 8, 2009), http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2009/10/nobelodds.html. Nobel prospects have also figured in divorce settlements. See Jason English, Odd
Facts About Nobel Prize Winners, CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/wayoflife/
10/06/mf.nobel.odd.facts/index.html (last updated Oct. 6, 2009 2:27 PM).
144. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 102–04 (1962) (explaining
shortfalls of “fixed money loans” in the context of human capital investment and discussing the
potential to contract over equity stakes in future earnings). For a dystopian take on an allencompassing system of equities in individuals, see generally DANI KOLLIN & EYTAN KOLLIN,
THE UNINCORPORATED MAN (2009).
145. Royalties do commonly provide authors and artists a continuing share of the upside
potential, but these are usually a small fraction of the overall proceeds. Termination provisions
in copyright law also place some limits on the ability to permanently alienate rights to creative
works. JULIE E. COHEN, LYDIA PALLAS LOREN, RUTH L. OKEDIJI & MAUREEN O’ROURKE,
COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 177–80 (2d ed. 2006) (citing 17 U.S.C.
§§ 203, 304(c), 304(d) (2006)).
146. See Jorge Alonso & Richard Watt, Efficient Distribution of Copyright Income, in THE
ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 81, 89 (Wendy J.
Gordon & Richard Watt eds., 2003) (“[Advance payment of royalties] is equivalent to the
distributor insuring the artist, since if the royalties due never turn out to reach the up-front
payment amount, then it is the distributor that suffers the loss.”).
147. See id. at 81 (noting how the creator’s lack of involvement in production and
distribution under standard copyright agreements raises the question of how the resulting
income will be shared).
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more artists might become interested in selling equity shares à la
148
carte—at least if regulatory hurdles could be surmounted.
Liquidity needs are an important impetus for some of these
REVEs, given that people are often unable to borrow against their
149
own future earnings. This raises the question of whether risk
rearrangement is the best response to the liquidity crunch, or whether
150
changes in lending practices would be preferable. In some cases,
though, risk buffering appears to be the dominant motive for selling
equity shares in future earnings. Professional athletes with
frontloaded earning profiles, for example, may be much more
interested in hedging career-ending injuries than in generating extra
151
liquidity. Another alternative, of course, would be for athletes to
expressly insure against the injury itself, a garden-variety form of
ditch coverage.
It would also be possible for people to place bets on their future
income increases, whether to intensify their own incentives or to
152
signal a high level of confidence. For example, a worker could pay
the expected value of a possible future bonus to a reverse insurer who
agrees to match the actual value of the bonus if the worker in fact
153
receives it (a gravy gamble).
148. U.K.-based Bandstocks allows fans to invest in bands through their websites in
exchange for specified benefits, including shares of the bands’ future income. BANDSTOCKS,
http://www.bandstocks.dloadshop.com (last visited Jan. 23, 2011); see also Owen Gibson, Don’t
Just Buy the Music, Fans Told—Now You Can Invest in Big Names of the Future, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/aug/27/musicindustry.investing
(reporting on Bandstocks). Other companies offering similar approaches include another U.K.
company, SlicethePie, SLICETHEPIE, http://www.slicethepie.com (last visited Jan. 23, 2011), and
Amsterdam-based Sellaband, SELLABAND, http://www.sellaband.com (last visited Jan. 23,
2011).
149. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 144, at 102 (“Investment in human beings cannot be
financed on the same terms or with the same ease as investment in physical capital.”). For
discussion and critique of limits on the alienability of human capital, see generally Stewart E.
Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383 (1993).
150. For example, student loans represent one way in which people can effectively borrow
against future earnings, and one that was historically facilitated by governmental involvement in
guaranteeing loans. See Hockett, supra note 7, at 927–30. For discussion of loan products that
blend risk rearrangement with liquidity, see infra text accompanying note 157.
151. Similarly, college athletes might be persuaded to delay entering the draft by insurance
against the effect of injuries on their professional prospects, even though colleges are restricted
from providing them with upfront cash payments. Thomas W. Hazlett & Joshua D. Wright, Hell
No, Don’t Let Them Go!, CHI. TRIB., May 8, 2008, at 25.
152. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 1, at 218–21 (describing “anti-insurance for gains”); see
also infra text accompanying notes 267–69.
153. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 1, at 218–21 (explaining how incentives could be
amplified in this manner through side deals with anti-insurers). As recent work by Michael
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2. Livelihood and Income Insurance.
Robert Shiller has
proposed mechanisms that would allow people to hedge against
changes in the profitability of a chosen profession, such as a particular
154
scientific subspecialty. His approach contemplates payouts that are
not simply based on a given individual’s career trajectory but that
instead make use of indexes that capture trends within different
155
fields.
Robert Hockett has similarly advocated significantly
expanding the risk-management opportunities extended to workers
and business owners through a suite of hedging instruments based on
156
economic and social indicators. Another set of proposals involves
tying student-loan repayment obligations to future earnings in various
157
ways.
Other sorts of private unemployment or “salary-gap”
158
insurance have also been attempted, albeit with limited success.

Abramowicz and Ian Ayres demonstrates, the logic of Cooter and Porat’s approach could also
be extended to cases in which an event or outcome initially implicates the interests of only one
person—such as a dieter who wishes to place a bet on losing weight. Abramowicz & Ayres,
supra note 50, at 43–44.
154. SHILLER, supra note 4, at 107–13; see also Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting
Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1272–78
(2005) (discussing Shiller’s proposal).
155. SHILLER, supra note 4, at 112–13.
156. Robert Hockett, Just Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging: Information,
Distributive Equity, Efficiency, and New Markets for Systemic-Income-Risk-Pricing and
Systemic-Income-Risk-Trading in a “New Economy,” 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, 214–26
(2004).
157. Federally guaranteed student loans now build in protection against low earnings by
capping payments at 15 percent of the amount by which the borrower’s income exceeds 150
percent of the poverty line and forgiving amounts remaining due after twenty-five years if
payment requirements or other criteria are met (ten years if in public service); for loans issued
after July 1, 2014, the payment cap will drop to 10 percent and the maximum time to forgiveness
will be reduced to twenty years. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-152, § 2213, 124 Stat. 1029, 1081 (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1098e); Mary Pilon, Exploiting
the New Student-Loan Rules, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2010, at B8; see also MIGUEL PALACIOS
LLERAS, INVESTING IN HUMAN CAPITAL: A CAPITAL MARKETS APPROACH TO STUDENT
FUNDING 41–123 (2004) (exploring the possibility of “human capital contracts”); SHILLER,
supra note 4, at 139–48 (discussing “income-linked loans”); E.G. West, The Yale Tuition
Postponement Plan in the Mid-Seventies, 5 HIGHER ED. 169, 169–75 (1976) (analyzing Yale’s
income-contingent loan program); Ron Lieber, Aid for Students Facing Mountain of Debt, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, at B1 (reviewing past proposals and a new innovation called “SafeStart”
that would provide an interest-free credit line to repay student loans if earnings are low in the
early years out of school).
158. See Ron Lieber, Insure Yourself Against a Job Loss? Good Luck., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2009, at B1 (surveying some attempted and proposed programs). Private insurance against one
manifestation of unemployment is found in Hyundai’s recent “assurance” program permitting
car buyers who finance or lease their vehicles to return them upon job loss (and other specified
events) for up to one year without being responsible for up to $7,500 in negative equity.
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Publicly provided unemployment insurance and means-tested social
welfare benefits represent embedded mechanisms for buffering
downside income and employment risk, justified in part by the
159
difficulty of sustaining private markets in these types of insurance.
All of these alternatives fall within the domain of ditch coverage, at
least insofar as continued employment and past returns to a
profession represent the operative baselines.
3. Reverse Insuring Poverty and Unemployment. People might
also wish to engage in REVEs that involve ceding future claims
against the social safety net in exchange for expected value
payments—a form of ditch exposure. Such exchanges are generally
160
viewed as problematic, for reasons that will be developed below.
Nonetheless, a small-scale version of reverse insurance is quietly
dispensed through many state welfare programs: families with acute,
short-term needs can elect to receive a one-time lump sum payment
in exchange for temporarily forgoing the right to seek regular
monthly benefit payments under the Temporary Assistance for
161
Needy Families (TANF) program. Although such families are
already suffering from a covered event under the social-insurance
scheme (poverty), the full extent and impact of the event is typically
unknown at the time of the election. After receiving the cash
payment, the family must bear whatever losses eventuate during the
162
period in which they are precluded from seeking TANF benefits.
To take another example, consider the fact that some jobs come
with a form of implicit insurance against termination except for
limited reasons. The tenure protection extended to university
Assurance Homepage, HYUNDAI, http://www.hyundaiusa.com/assurance/index.aspx (last visited
Jan. 23, 2011).
159. See Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 335, 362–65 (2001) (discussing difficulties in privately insuring against unemployment).
160. See infra
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professors is a classic example. Undoing this insurance through ditchexposure transactions would involve currently tenured professors
accepting a sum of money in exchange for being exposed to the same
163
risk of termination as an at-will employee.
E. Health and Quality of Life
Health insurance is a familiar, if often controversial, form of
ditch coverage. Yet a number of less conventional possibilities exist
for addressing risk associated with health and other aspects of one’s
quality of life. Some of these alternatives could change the terms of
the health-insurance debate in fundamental ways. One set of ideas
squarely confronts the fact that, as people move through time, they
learn new information about their likely health risks. People might
wish to insure against the higher insurance rates that such new
information will produce by purchasing insurance against future high
164
insurance premiums.
These are standard ditch-coverage
transactions, but they reach risks that presently either go unaddressed
or are approached clumsily through limits on insurance risk
165
classifications or exclusions. There are limits to this approach,
however, given the impossibility of initiating coverage before at least
166
some important information about health risks becomes known.

163. Steven Levitt, for example, has stated that he would gladly give up tenure for a $15,000
salary increase. Steven D. Levitt, Let’s Just Get Rid of Tenure (Including Mine),
FREAKONOMICS (Mar. 3, 2007, 11:31 PM), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/03/03/
lets-just-get-rid-of-tenure.
164. See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to Meet the
Practice of Insurance, 2004 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FIN. SERVICES 1, 21 (noting the
potential appeal of such coverage as well as its rarity). For example, “gene insurance” procured
before genetic testing occurs would enable individuals to affordably purchase health insurance
that is accurately priced based on genetic information. See Alexander Tabarrok, Gene
Insurance, in ENTREPRENEURIAL ECONOMICS: BRIGHT IDEAS FROM THE DISMAL SCIENCE 47,
47–48 (Alexander Tabarrok ed., 2002); see also John H. Cochrane, Time-Consistent Health
Insurance, in ENTREPRENEURIAL ECONOMICS, supra, at 53, 55 (describing how insurance
contracts with periodic payouts keyed to changes in expected lifetime health costs would enable
insureds to pay higher premiums or negotiate lower premiums as information about health
prospects emerges); Reed Abelson, UnitedHealth to Insure the Right to Insurance, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2008, at B1 (describing a policy that allows a consumer to buy insurance at a later date);
Tyler Cowen, Insurance Markets in Everything, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (Dec. 3, 2008, 10:02
AM),
http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2008/12/insurance-marke.html
(discussing the UnitedHealth policy).
165. See, for example, the discussion of limits on genetic information at infra text
accompanying notes 227, 294–95.
166. As Richard Zeckhauser notes, “even infancy is too late for contracting” to spread
health risks fully; “[b]y the time a child is born, his catastrophic health needs are determined to
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Another set of ideas builds on the notion that money may
167
produce less marginal utility in the ill state than in the well state.
For example, expensive travel may become unenjoyable if one is
suffering from a debilitating and untreatable disease. Thus, someone
who loves to travel might wish to move money from the state of the
world in which she is sick (in ways that money cannot remediate) to
the state of the world in which she is healthy. Richard Zeckhauser
describes one manifestation of this idea—a kind of “commune” in
which elderly people contribute to a fund that is earmarked for
whoever among them remains healthy enough to enjoy using the
168
money. This transaction spans the rows in Figure 3, giving an
individual participant a chance at more money while healthy (an
event-enhancing move that might be characterized as either ditch
169
coverage or a gravy gamble), funded by an event-detracting REVE
(which might be characterized as either ditch exposure or a gravy
170
giveup).
Many other variations are imaginable. Suppose, for example, a
senior citizen has a 50 percent chance of developing a mobility
impairment that will cause him to prefer living in a very small onelevel apartment; otherwise, he would prefer to live in a stylish, multilevel house that he cannot currently afford. An investor might enter
a substantial extent in the statistical sense.” Zeckhauser, supra note 30, at 159. It might be
possible to move coverage earlier than birth or even conception. For example, Kyle Logue and
Joel Slemrod have suggested that parents might purchase pre-conception “genetic endowment
insurance.” Kyle Logue & Joel Slemrod, Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of Widely
Available Genetic Information, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 843, 859 (2008). But even this pre-conception
insurance might come too late given the effect of the parents’ genetic endowments on their
children’s expected genetic endowments.
167. See, e.g., Viscusi & Evans, supra note 34, at 371 (positing that less than full wage
replacement is optimal for worker’s compensation because “the marginal utility of income is
lower in the ill health state,” and finding, using two approaches based on worker survey data,
that “the marginal utility of a given level of income was greater when healthy than when
injured”).
168. Zeckhauser, supra note 30, at 157.
169. On one view, the transaction insures one against running out of funds during a period
of continued good health, when such funds are especially necessary and utility producing. This
interpretation would line up at least roughly with ditch coverage. The idea is analogous to that
behind an annuity, where the hazard in question is outliving one’s wealth. See id. (describing
annuities as “anti-life insurance”). An alternative interpretation would be that one is buying a
lottery ticket that may provide an upside payoff to augment the good luck of remaining healthy;
this would amount to a gravy gamble.
170. One might view the agreement to give up funds in the event of poor health as leaving
one exposed to an unremediated ditch. If money is less utility producing when one is in a state
of poor health, however, the forgone funds may represent a form of gravy that one would rather
sell off one’s rights to receive.
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into an arrangement with him whereby she will cover half the cost of
the multi-level home, conditional on the senior citizen turning the
home over to her as sole owner in the event the impairment
171
Such approaches have the interesting feature of
develops.
encouraging the production of accurate information about possible
health states, given that this information offers a source of financial
172
leverage.
Relatedly, a REVE might address concerns about the proportion
of health care dollars spent on end-of-life health care when quality of
173
life may be low. Suppose that a screening procedure indicates that a
patient has a 10 percent chance of developing condition X. If
condition X develops, the patient could extend her life by roughly
three months through treatment that costs $500,000; however, she
would be in significant discomfort during most of that time. If her
health insurance covers this treatment, she is effectively holding a
claim worth the present value equivalent of $50,000 in medical
treatment. Suppose the patient could trade in her claim to this
expensive end-of-life treatment at the time of screening for a payment
that she can use during the disease’s latency period, or for a payment
that she (or her estate, if X develops) will enjoy at the end of the
latency period. Such an approach would constitute a form of partial
171. The “housing partnerships” idea developed by Andrew Caplin and his coauthors
similarly contemplates investors going in with homeowners on their home purchases and sharing
rights to equity, although for different reasons and pursuant to different sharing rules. See
generally ANDREW CAPLIN, SEWIN CHAN, CHARLES FREEMAN & JOSEPH TRACY, HOUSING
PARTNERSHIPS: A NEW APPROACH TO A MARKET AT A CROSSROADS (1997). Another
analogue is found in schemes in which an elderly individual signs over rights to a property upon
her death (in effect, selling the home subject to a reserved life estate). See Flavia Kraus-Jackson
& Flavia Rotondi, Death Offers Lifeline to Italian Property as Economy Worsens, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 25, 2009, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
a46kTFrO8guY&ref (describing “nude sales” in which ownership passes but the seller has the
right to life-long occupancy). More generally, future interests in land embed risk allocations.
Again, the life estate is a prime example insofar as it provides a hedge to the beneficiary
occupying the property and moves actuarial risk to the party holding the residual claim. See
Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 58 n.210 (1995); see also Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative
Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 35–36 (1992) (noting the risk-shifting characteristics of
contingent or defeasible interests).
172. For a discussion of how new hedging markets could spur information production, see
Hockett, supra note 156, at 228–30.
173. Whether too much is spent at the end of life is a difficult question. For a recent
economic analysis of terminal care, see generally Tomas J. Philipson, Gary Becker, Dana
Goldman & Kevin M. Murphy, The Value of Life Near Its End and Terminal Care (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15649, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w15649.pdf.
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reverse insurance that might be framed either as a REVE that
exposes the patient to a ditch (the untreated condition X) or as one in
which the patient gives up a form of (unpalatable) gravy (the
treatment for condition X).
Health is not the only aspect of well-being that might be
addressed through new REVEs. For example, family configurations
carry an enormous potential to alter one’s need for, and utility from,
money. Although there are obvious impediments to insuring against
events like divorce or child-bearing, some hedging might still occur in
174
these areas, whether through social policy or private innovations.
On the more quotidian end of the spectrum, betting on sports events
is a familiar way to add risk to one’s life; it is also possible that people
might want to hedge utility losses by betting against their favorite
175
teams. A recently introduced variation is insurance that participants
in fantasy sports leagues can purchase against injuries sustained by
176
the players they have selected. Individuals and households might
ultimately be able to hedge a broad range of risks to their well-being,
177
from a shortage of sunny days to population, income, or crime
178
trends in their current or future communities. Alternatively, people

174. For example, social policies that direct resources toward those raising children have the
effect of buffering some of the financial impacts of procreation. Family law, too, can affect the
ways in which certain risks are allocated among individuals, families, and society as a whole. See
generally Anne L. Alstott, Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 3 (2010). Private shifting of familial risks might also be attempted. One company
has announced plans to offer a “guaranty” on marriage. Marriage Insurance, SAFEGUARD
GUARANTY CORP., http://www.safeguardguaranty.com/Investors3.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2011); see also Robin Hanson, Marriage Futures, OVERCOMING BIAS (Oct. 22, 2007, 6:00 AM),
http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/10/marriage-future.html (discussing the potential market
for “marriage futures”); Dave Hoffman, Should You Buy Divorce Insurance?, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Aug. 2, 2007, 11:44 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/08/
should_you_buy_1.html (discussing obstacles to divorce insurance and describing SafeGuard’s
product as an “investment vehicle,” not insurance).
175. See Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection:
The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q.J. ECON. 143, 149 n.14 (1977).
176. Nando Di Fino, A New Kind of Pocket Protection, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203550604574360691019757738.html.
177. Weather futures have already claimed an important niche market among those in
weather-sensitive industries. See, e.g., Come Rain or Come Shine, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2007, at
78, 78–79; Weather Products, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/weather (last
visited Jan. 23, 2011); see also Croley & Hanson, supra note 1, at 1796–97 (presenting a
hypothetical in which people might wish to reallocate sunshine across different states of the
world).
178. See, e.g., Hockett, supra note 156, at 214–25 (illustrating some of these possibilities by
discussing the risks a hypothetical couple faces as they move through life). To the extent that
these factors are capitalized into property values or salaries, some of the other mechanisms
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might consciously add risk to their everyday lives in ways that would
intensify gains or deepen losses, whether to provide themselves with
179
optimal incentives to engage in certain behaviors or to get a chance
180
at an indivisible or “lumpy” gain.
III. EFFICIENCY AND RISK CUSTOMIZATION
The discussion to this point has emphasized both the existing
gaps and asymmetries in risk markets, and the growing interest
among both scholars and entrepreneurs in finding ways to fill them in.
Law can take a variety of stances toward these developments, from
maintaining or toughening prohibitions on REVEs, to replacing
181
outright bans with liability rules, to loosening or lifting restrictions,
to subsidizing or otherwise facilitating the development of new risk
markets, to setting up government-provided opportunities to trade in
unbundled risk.
Broadly speaking, there are three sets of costs that legal policy
must take into account when deciding how much risk customization
182
to allow or encourage. First are the costs associated with a default

discussed above would buffer the risks associated with them. For a discussion of the
capitalization of local goods and services into home values, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 39–51 (2001). For an analysis of the degree to which local laws are
capitalized into property values and wages, see generally Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local
Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1273 (2008).
179. See generally Cooter & Porat, supra note 1. For interesting elaborations and extensions
of this approach, see generally Abramowicz & Ayres, supra note 50.
180. A good is “lumpy” if it exhibits indivisibilities, so that having a mere portion of the
good does not deliver a proportionate amount of utility. See, e.g., Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward,
Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL.
STUD. 350, 353 (1982) (discussing public goods that “cannot be usefully provided in any
amounts but only in more or less massive ‘lumps’”). A desire for indivisible blocks of
consumption provides one possible explanation for lottery play. A formal exploration of this
point is provided in Ng Yew Kwang, Why Do People Buy Lottery Tickets? Choices Involving
Risk and the Indivisibility of Expenditure, 73 J. POL. ECON. 530 (1965); see also Edward J.
McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 71, 99–105
(discussing the “indivisibility of expenditure” rationale for risk seeking through lotteries). The
same basic idea likely supports many other gambles—for instance, betting on one’s team to win,
where the money to fund a really good celebration and the psychic payoff of a win are
complementary goods. See Cook & Graham, supra note 175, at 149 n.14 (noting the relevance of
wealth-related changes in the value of a win to betting decisions). People might also bet on good
vacation weather, favorable medical outcomes, or any other event or condition with
consequences that would increase the marginal utility of money.
181. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1092 (defining liability rules).
182. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 24–42 (2000) (examining optimal
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or mandatory risk allocation that is suboptimal for at least some
interactions. Affected parties must bear either the cost of the
suboptimal allocation (which may include the cost of altering
consumption or activity choices in an effort to adjust risk obliquely),
or the cost of moving away from the default—whichever is less.
Easing moves away from the default allocation would reduce these
costs, but it could also facilitate inefficient risk shifts, whether due to
mistakes, cognitive biases, or externalities. Thus, a second category of
costs is made up of mistaken or socially harmful risk reallocations
from a given starting point. A third set of costs stems not from any
particular risk arrangement but rather from heterogeneity in risk
arrangements within a particular domain.
In considering these costs and their relationships to each other
and to legal policy, a threshold question inevitably arises: has the
status quo already gotten it at least roughly right, so that most (if not
all) of the missing entries in the risk menu “deserve” to be missing? If
so, then perhaps the first category of costs, those stemming from
suboptimal risk allocations, is a null set once the problems associated
with the missing alternatives are taken into account. Risk markets
183
that are not observed even though they are legally permitted seem
especially vulnerable to this criticism. Thus, I will start by considering
why a presently absent risk endstate might be either unsustainable or
unattainable, notwithstanding its legal availability. Next, I will turn to
the second category of costs—those that result from parties choosing
risk allocations that harm themselves or others—to determine
whether legal prohibitions track these concerns. Finally, I will
examine the potential costs of heterogeneity as such.
A. Unsustainable or Unattainable Risk Endstates
REVEs are used to move from an existing risk allocation to a
new one. The Subsections below consider reasons why an endstate
arrangement might be difficult to reach or sustain, not all of which
carry equivalent implications. If a new allocation cannot be
successfully sustained over time because its costs exceed its benefits,
nothing is lost by not being able to move to it. But the present

standardization in the property context by weighing “frustration costs” to the parties of limited
forms against the costs that customization may impose on the system and on third parties).
183. “Legally permitted” turns out not to be a binary on/off classification, given that
innumerable regulatory frictions, as well as asymmetries in the delivery of tax benefits and the
like, can discourage new arrangements without banning them outright.
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unattainability of a risk endstate does not necessarily signal its social
worthlessness; remediable distortions (such as the inability to
internalize the benefits of offering an innovative arrangement) may
184
instead be responsible.
1. Moral Hazard. Certain REVEs might not emerge because the
underlying risk arrangements they bring about cannot be profitably
offered due to moral-hazard concerns. Moral hazard refers to the
tendency of those insured against a loss to do less to avoid that loss
185
than they would if they had to fully bear it. The problem emerges
when a particular hazard or potentiality blends together factors under
a party’s control with those that are not under her control. Kenneth
Arrow has accordingly characterized the moral-hazard problem as
186
one of incomplete risk definition. Although often kept within
acceptable bounds through measures like deductibles, copayments,
187
coverage limitations, and monitoring, moral hazard can make
private insurance markets difficult or impossible to sustain in some
cases. Even if the controllable and uncontrollable aspects of a given
event can be defined in the abstract, informational and administrative
difficulties may make isolation of these components prohibitively
188
costly or impracticable. Thus, there may be instances in which
REVEs are not feasible because the risk in question simply cannot be
184. Pinpointing exactly what causes certain kinds of financial markets to thrive while others
fail is notoriously difficult. See, e.g., Susan J. Smith, Managing Financial Risks: The Strange Case
of Housing, in MANAGING FINANCIAL RISKS: FROM GLOBAL TO LOCAL 233, 240–42, 250
(Gordon L. Clark, Adam D. Dixon & Ashby H.B. Monk eds., 2009) (noting various possibilities
and observing that “most experts agree that there is always a ‘factor 13’—an element that defies
generalization, yet which can be accounted for” among the conditions supporting a successful
new derivatives market).
185. See Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public
Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 366 (1970) (“[T]he fact that someone has
insurance may alter his behavior so that the observed outcome is adverse to the insurer.”).
186. See ARROW, supra note 7, at 142 (identifying the moral-hazard problem as
accompanying situations where “the risk-bearer cannot completely define his risks” and instead
“only observes a result which is a mixture of the unavoidable risk, against which he is willing to
insure, and human decision”); KENNETH J. ARROW, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING, supra note 7, at 177, 202
(explaining that it would be better if “the event against which insurance is taken [were] out of
the control of the individual,” but noting that “[u]nfortunately, in real life this separation can
never be made perfectly”).
187. See ARROW, supra note 7, at 142–43.
188. For example, a potential tort victim in a strict liability regime might wish to contract
with her potential injurer to downgrade coverage to negligence only, yet this customization
would be unworkable unless courts in such regimes were willing to make negligence
determinations. I thank Saul Levmore for discussions on this point.
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unbundled from components under individual control to the degree
189
necessary to support a market transaction.
Although moral hazard is a powerful consideration that bears on
the viability of markets in risk, it does not appear to be a likely
explanation for the patterns of missing REVEs observed in the real
world. Significantly, REVEs can resolve as well as introduce moralhazard problems. Most obviously, a REVE can place risk on the party
best positioned to influence outcomes (or on more of the parties
whose behavior is relevant to the outcome) when the law’s default
position fails to do so. Indeed, where insurance produces a risk of
moral hazard, reverse insurance does the opposite, reviving incentives
to take due care by exposing parties to the full effects of their risktaking actions. Thus, the relative dearth of reverse-insurance
opportunities seems to require some explanation other than gardenvariety moral-hazard concerns.
One potential concern is illustrated well by unmatured tort
claims: if a victim has sold her claim, will she participate
wholeheartedly in litigation to recover damages for it? Will she even
bother to report the event? Interestingly, the concern here is not with
the effects of the reverse-insurance transaction as such but rather with
the implicit insurance it generates in the linked litigation arena. A risk
that ordinarily falls on victims—that the litigation process will not
return damages that fairly reflect realized events—has been
effectively transferred to the claim purchaser along with the tort claim
itself. This implicit insurance may induce those who are covered to do
too little to avoid the risk of a loss (here, the loss from litigation
failure). But the problem could presumably be addressed through the
kinds of measures that insurers already routinely take: contractual
restrictions, partial coverage, and the like. Similar points can be made
about risk rearrangements in other contexts. Homeowners who
transfer home-value risk or appreciation potential to investors, for
example, may be less concerned with selling their home for a good
price—a problem that could be addressed by presumptively basing

189. Innovation could change the cost calculation, however. See SHILLER, supra note 4, at
72–73, 222–25 (discussing advances in indexes and their role in risk innovation); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699,
1726–29, 1752–54 (2006) (describing the potential role of new forms of monitoring and
information sharing in the pricing of risk).
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payouts on area home-price indexes or by granting a right of first
190
refusal to the investors involved.
David Friedman has also observed that a form of “reverse moral
hazard” could produce difficulties for reverse-insurance markets
191
despite the social efficiency of the added care. Friedman explains
that people who sell their claims will take additional precautions that,
albeit socially desirable, lower the value of the claim to the buyer
below the value demanded by the seller, a reduction that “may
192
prevent the sale.” To see this point, consider a potential tort victim,
Vera, who sells her unmatured claim. Because of the implicit
insurance provided by the tort system, Vera begins with an
entitlement package that effectively permits her to indulge in some
degree of moral hazard. Once Vera sells her claim and will have to
bear her own actual losses, however, she will take optimal, not
suboptimal, precautions. Knowing this, a third-party reverse insurer
will price the claim based on optimal precaution levels, giving Vera
nothing for her added precaution costs. Of course, the potential
injurer in the story (who will have to compensate the reverse insurer
in the event of a loss) benefits from Vera’s changes in care levels, and
thus should be willing to kick in an additional portion to subsidize the
sale. But the added transaction costs associated with arranging this
193
side payment may keep the deal from occurring.
Interestingly, it is precisely where the gains from reverse
insurance are the greatest (that is, where the moral-hazard problem
that would be relieved is the largest) that this phenomenon would
drive the largest wedge between what the person selling a claim
would be asked to give up and what the person buying the claim
would be willing to pay. Because the potential social gains would be
so great in that context, mechanisms for lowering transaction costs
might prove worthwhile if they could be devised. Formulating them
could implicate another issue that has broader significance in risk
markets—innovation costs expended on gains that might not be fully
realized by the innovator.

190. See CAPLIN ET AL., supra note 171, at 136–38 (proposing a right of first refusal in the
housing partnership context); Robert J. Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, Moral Hazard in Home
Equity Conversion, 28 REAL EST. ECON. 1, 2, 27–28 (2000) (suggesting the use of home-price
indexes in arrangements for shifting home-value risk).
191. Friedman, supra note 33, at 93 n.13.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 91.
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2. Innovation Costs. Developing innovative new products often
requires significant upfront expenditures on research and marketing,
194
but may fail to produce the hoped-for returns. Demand may be
lacking, or the business model may prove less profitable than
expected. Potential changes in the legal and regulatory
environment—as well as the untested application of existing laws—
represent additional sources of uncertainty for new risk-management
products. In other words, designing a REVE is itself a risky
enterprise. Even if the risk pays off and a new REVE is successful,
the ability of others to quickly copy the successful business model will
195
diminish the returns to the innovator. If this factor is important in
explaining missing REVEs markets, innovation could be encouraged
196
through subsidies offered ex ante or through intellectual property
197
protections provided ex post.
3. Switching, Searching, and Social Norms. Additional barriers to
198
199
REVEs might include search costs, switching costs, and social
norms. For example, if people feel pressure to configure risk similarly

194. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 354–60 (2008) (analyzing potential impediments to
market experimentation).
195. In this respect, risk innovation resembles a public good that the private market may be
likely to underprovide. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS
FOR MANAGING SOCIETY’S LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS 207–08 (1993) (discussing the
“tendency for under-investment in the creation of new markets”).
196. Id. at 208 (“The establishment of new markets, because of the public nature of its
benefits, is one of the most fitting places for government subsidy.”).
197. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 194, at 361–71 (modeling the effects of
intellectual property protections on market experimentation and illustrating this point in the
context of markets for new products).
198. The more difficult it is for an individual to learn about an alternative to the status quo,
or the less “available” to her are the concerns to which that alternative responds, the less likely
she will be to engage in a REVE. See Johnson et al., supra note 19, at 39–42 (discussing the role
of mental “availability” of risks in a variety of insurance contexts); Howard Kunreuther,
Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB. POL’Y 227 (1976) (observing that people
in flood- and earthquake-prone areas often lack awareness of the relevant risks and of the
availability and cost of insurance).
199. Switching from one risk arrangement to another may induce regret if it turns out badly;
knowing this, people may avoid change. See Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual
Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management
of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 340 (1986) (describing how “regret aversion” may lead
people to avoid making choices). For an examination of the potential effect of anticipated regret
on new markets in housing risk, see Robert J. Shiller, Derivatives Markets for Home Prices 17–
20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13962, 2008), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w13962.pdf.
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to others in their reference group, this could raise the cost of
switching to an unconventional alternative. In addition, certain
200
unfamiliar risk-shifting arrangements may generate visceral distaste.
201
Such factors are potentially malleable, but they may nonetheless
reduce the demand for certain REVEs or raise the reputational cost
202
of offering them.
The same factors that can impede the spread of REVEs may
support their adoption under certain circumstances. For example,
scholarship examining decisions to obtain or do without flood or
earthquake insurance suggests a quite significant role for word-of203
mouth communications about insurance purchases. These contacts
may not only lower search costs, but may also help establish and
204
communicate social norms about insurance. Given the potential
effects of learning and of interdependence in choices, it is difficult to
infer from the absence of a REVE market that such a market would
ultimately prove unsuccessful.
4. Framing. Finally, framing effects may cause individual actors,
or even society as a whole, to reject alternatives simply because they
involve moves in an unaccustomed direction. For example, allowing
people to shed insurance coverage that is embedded in the existing
tort regime (such as that covering pain and suffering) may seem
highly suspect until one imagines a world in which that coverage is

200. Bets that involve life and death seem to produce especially strong reactions, and
markets in everything from life insurance to predictions of terrorism risks have been affected.
See Michael Pereira, Risk Management for the Age of Information, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 715, 732–33 (2004) (reviewing SHILLER, supra note 4) (noting the negative public response to
efforts by the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to establish a
predictions market for Middle Eastern political events); Roth, supra note 96, at 41–42
(discussing the implications of “[r]epugnance to betting on life and death” for a variety of
markets).
201. See Roth, supra note 96, at 38 (observing that transactions may be considered
“repugnant in some times and places and not in others”); see also id. at 39 tbl.1 (listing
repugnant transactions, past and present). The distaste associated with some kinds of REVEs
may ultimately prove transient. See, e.g., id. at 41 (observing that life insurance “seems to have
had to overcome initial repugnance in the early 1800s”).
202. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2040
(1996) (suggesting that people’s reluctance to insure against certain losses could be a function of
social norms).
203. See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 76–77.
204. See id. at 77 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 903 (1996)); id. at 96. Some of these peer effects may relate to predictions about how
forthcoming outside assistance will be in the event of a loss; the more unusual it is to be
uninsured, the less likely one might judge such assistance. Id.
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not provided and asks whether everyone should be forced to buy it
205
anew. Similarly, risks that are currently part of standard legal
bundles, such as the housing-market volatility that accompanies
homeownership, may be unthinkingly accepted. Shedding that risk
seems odd—at least until one asks whether, given the choice, a typical
family would buy shares anew that would deliver payouts based on
factors like the actions of their local government, changes in the
regional labor market, and the movement of other economic
206
indicators that affect the local housing market.
Seeing REVEs in action can encourage people to ask such
“repurchase” questions. If unbundled risk transactions become more
commonplace, and if the frame-flipping that they encourage becomes
more reflexive, society might see advances in how people think about
risk bearing. Risk allocations that now appear as simply part of the
background conditions against which decisions are made might
become visible as conscious choices—arrangements that could be
otherwise. This argument suggests that widespread private risk
trading could have some characteristics of a public good, to the extent
that it helps to build a culture in which the risk-bearing characteristics
of situations are noticed and actively considered. Put differently, it
raises the intriguing possibility that lack of interest in some REVEs is,
at least in part, a product of existing arrangements—a failure of
207
imagination rather than well-informed disinterest.

205. Even if some people would value such coverage, there is reason to believe that many
others would not. Whether demand for such coverage would exist in the absence of tort law has
been the subject of much scholarly discussion. For an overview of the literature on this question
and some new empirical findings, see generally Ronen Avraham, Should Pain-and-Suffering
Damages Be Abolished from Tort Law? More Experimental Evidence, 55 TORONTO L. REV. 941
(2005). For further discussion, see Cooter, supra note 2, at 388–94; and Schwartz, supra note 34,
at 364–67.
206. See William A. Fischel, Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144, 146 (2001)
(analogizing the purchase of a home to the purchase of undiversified stock in the local housing
market).
207. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 144, at 103–04 (suggesting that high administrative costs
may not fully explain the lack of equity markets in human capital, and that other factors—such
as “the novelty of the idea,” “the reluctance to think of investment in human beings as strictly
comparable to investment in physical assets,” and legal and other limitations—may play an
important role); Hockett, supra note 7, at 946–47 (suggesting that factors such as inertia and
lack of imagination may explain missing markets in risk); Hockett, supra note 156, at 218
(observing that, in the context of risk markets, “[t]he imaginative space in which demands are
formed is itself in part a function of what is already supplied”); Robert J. Shiller, Radical
Financial Innovation, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND THE GROWTH MECHANISM
OF THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIES 306, 320 (Eytan Sheshinski, Robert J. Strom & William
Baumol eds., 2007) (noting psychological barriers to the adoption of new risk-management
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B. Socially Costly REVEs
In some cases REVEs are unavailable due to legal prohibitions.
To the extent that these prohibitions are binding (that is, they block
transactions that would otherwise occur), the expected justification
would involve unaccounted-for costs placed on parties other than
those directly engaged in the transaction or, perhaps, on temporal
selves that are not well represented in the transaction. The
Subsections below examine how well these concerns about
externalities and internalities map onto existing legal prohibitions.
1. Externalities. In some cases, a party who purports to accept a
given risk can actually offload part or all of any resulting loss onto
208
others. Consider, for example, insurance requirements designed to
209
counter the problem of judgment-proof defendants. A tortfeasor’s
choice to do without insurance, if she is otherwise unable to pay for
the damage she does, shifts the loss to another party. Similarly,
because the need to resort to social insurance can often be reduced by
purchasing or retaining other forms of insurance, the decision to go
uninsured (or to give up one’s coverage for an expected value
210
payment) can impose externalities on others. The government, as
211
“insurer of last resort,” has an interest in precluding risk taking that

mechanisms and suggesting that innovative framing could overcome them); Smith, supra note
184, at 242–45 (discussing potential “cultural economy” explanations for why housing
derivatives have been slow to catch on); see also supra Part III.A.2–4.
208. See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 58–59 (explaining that because “often the individual
does not have to bear all the costs that result if he chooses to leave losses unspread,” it may be
socially desirable to compel certain forms of insurance). As the recent financial meltdown has
underscored, the problem of purporting to take on risk that one will not actually have to bear is
by no means limited to individuals; it extends all the way up to entities considered “too big to
fail.”
209. See id.; Mattias K. Polborn, Mandatory Insurance and the Judgment-Proof Problem, 18
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 143–44 (1998); S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 45, 54 (1986). See generally Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements and
Compulsory Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem, 36 RAND J.
ECON. 63 (2005) [hereinafter Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements] (analyzing and comparing
minimum asset requirements and mandatory liability insurance as approaches to the problem of
judgment-proof defendants).
210. To the extent social insurance increases the tendency to do without private insurance,
the problem is one of moral hazard. See supra Part III.A.1.
211. The government is often referred to in these terms. See, e.g., ARYE L. HILLMAN,
PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF
GOVERNMENT 340 (2003); MOSS, supra note 7, at vii, 257; cf. TERESA A. SULLIVAN,
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 173–74 (1989) (characterizing bankruptcy
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would be expected to increase its losses. Just as private insurers might
mandate deadbolts or fire extinguishers to avoid losses, the
government might specify the purchase and use of certain insurance
products.
Thus, society’s normative commitment to provide some baseline
of support can explain why people are not permitted to cash out the
212
expected value of their future social insurance payments. In other
words, people are legally precluded from taking on downside risk that
would cut into their very basic subsistence needs. If society wishes to
provide insurance against such risks (rather than merely provide its
cash equivalent), the claim to those benefits must be made
inalienable. The provision of some baseline level of social insurance
does not, however, explain why claims to payoffs that exceed that
level should not be alienable.
Other laws preclude debtors from accepting the full risk of
default. For example, personal bankruptcy laws require creditors to
213
retain some of the risk associated with a debtor’s enterprises.
Similarly, laws forbidding recourse against a homeowner’s other
assets in the event of foreclosure can cause losses associated with the
downward movement of home prices to fall on parties other than
214
homebuyers. These laws precluding complete risk-bearing are
presumably designed to avoid the societal spillovers that would result

as “an insurer of last resort”). For a detailed examination of the government’s role as ultimate
insurer, see generally MOSS, supra note 7.
212. The Social Security Act, for example, provides that
[t]he right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be
transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or
payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any
bankruptcy or insolvency law.
42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2006); see also David Andolfatto, A Theory of Inalienable Property Rights,
110 J. POL. ECON. 382, 383–84 (2002) (discussing the inalienability of a variety of entitlements,
including rights to social security benefits and future pension income, as well as the rationale for
these limits). For a discussion of the general prohibition on alienating claims to social insurance
and some limited exceptions, see supra Part II.D.3.
213. See ARROW, supra note 7, at 139–40 (noting that under an arrangement like
bankruptcy protection or limited liability, “[t]he law in effect requires creditors to assume some
of the risks of the debtor; it does not leave him free to negotiate a risk-free investment, and it
provides for an inalienable limitation of risks to the debtor”); see also MOSS, supra note 7, at
123–51 (examining bankruptcy’s role as a risk-shifting mechanism).
214. See Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime
Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 30–32 (2009) (discussing state antideficiency laws and their
effect on default choices).
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215

from leaving debtors fully exposed to loss. One such externality
might be the debtor’s eligibility for various forms of social
insurance—protection necessary, in turn, to avoid the externalities
216
associated with unalleviated poverty. Of course, the bankruptcy
laws themselves impose spillovers on other parties—not the creditors,
who can price in the risk that the law forces them to bear, but the
nondefaulting debtors who must pay more for credit (or suffer from
reduced credit availability) as a result. The rules surrounding
bankruptcy discharge and similar protections must strike a balance
217
between these types of spillovers.
Negative spillovers (externalized losses) are often cited as a
reason for blocking REVEs, but positive spillovers (externalized
gains) can also be relevant. The discharge of debt in bankruptcy again
offers an interesting example. Empirical work supports the
theoretical claim that the U.S. personal bankruptcy system
encourages higher levels of entrepreneurship than would exist in the
218
absence of such a system. Allowing people to selectively undo this

215. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1393, 1418–24 (1985) (detailing a variety of externalities that would flow from debt in the
absence of debtor discharge). Internalities may also play a role. See id. at 1394 (hypothesizing
“that most people would choose to retain a nonwaivable right of discharge if they knew of the
psychological factors that tempt them to overconsume credit”); infra Part III.B.2.
216. See Jackson, supra note 215, at 1401–04 (observing that the backdrop of social
insurance offers a partial justification for the nonwaivability of the right of discharge in
bankruptcy). This rationale, however, would only justify inalienable protection up to the level of
support that social insurance would provide, not the far more extensive inalienable protections
available under bankruptcy law. Id. at 1403. The relationship between bankruptcy and other
forms of social insurance is explored more fully in Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social
Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129 (2005). See also
Richard M. Hynes, Non-Procrustean Bankruptcy, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 350–59, for a
discussion of bankruptcy’s place within “a larger social safety net.”
217. See Michelle J. White, Abuse or Protection? Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Under
‘BAPCPA,’ 18–19 ÉCONOMIE PUBLIQUE 3, 5 (2006) (explaining that bankruptcy law “balances
conflicting objectives of helping debtors in financial distress versus promoting credit availability
by protecting creditors”); id. at 17 (noting the impact of greater protections for debtors on credit
price and availability).
218. See Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of
Entrepreneurial Activity, 46 J. L. & ECON. 543 (2003) (developing a theoretical model for, and
empirically testing, the relationship between the size of the bankruptcy exemption and
entrepreneurship levels); see also F.H. Buckley, The Debtor as Victim, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
1078, 1089 (2002) (reviewing TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000)) (suggesting that
“bankruptcy might be a particularly useful incentive device in attracting employees to work in
high-risk jobs, such as start-up ventures”).
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protection through REVEs would be expected to raise the cost of
219
entrepreneurship.
2. Internalities.
Just as externalities are unaccounted-for
spillovers on other parties, “internalities” involve unaccounted-for
220
spillovers on other temporal selves. If some kinds of REVEs seem
especially likely to compromise parties’ own long-run interests, the
law might step in with bans or other mechanisms designed to control
221
these effects. For example, some REVEs would involve forgoing
future payoffs in exchange for immediate lump sums. This might raise
a concern if people tend to be myopic or prone to overvalue lump
222
sums relative to streams of payments. Similarly, if people are often
unduly optimistic in predicting the outcomes of risky endeavors, then
they might be overly inclined to engage in REVEs that actually leave
them worse off in expected value terms. But some of these cognitive
223
effects could be addressed without banning particular REVEs.
C. Costly Heterogeneity
A primary attraction of REVEs is their ability to accommodate
differences in risk preferences and risk-bearing capacities. But
heterogeneity in risk-bearing arrangements can also introduce costs.
Significantly, these heterogeneity costs are implicated whenever
people are afforded choice in risk arrangements; hence, they can
create problems in traditional insurance markets just as surely as they
219. The reason relates to adverse selection. See Feibelman, supra note 216, at 142–43
(observing that the mandatory nature of bankruptcy protection prevents opting-out patterns
that would leave only bad risks in the pool); see also Hynes, supra note 216, at 344–48
(characterizing debt relief as a form of mandatory insurance that responds to the problem of
adverse selection).
220. See R.J. Herrnstein, George F. Loewenstein, Drazen Prelec & William Vaughan, Jr.,
Utility Maximization and Melioration: Internalities in Individual Choice, 6 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 149, 150 (1993) (defining “internality” as a “within-person externality”).
221. Paternalism is a well-recognized motive for social policy. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra
note 1, at 55–58.
222. There is a vast literature on time preferences. For a helpful overview, see generally
Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time
Preference: A Critical Review, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 13 (George Loewenstein, Daniel Read & Roy
Baumeister eds., 2003). It is also often observed that people prefer lump sums over presentvalue-equivalent (or larger) streams of payments. See David Fetherstonhaugh & Lee Ross,
Framing Effects and Income Flow Preferences in Decisions About Social Security, in
BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 187, 194–96, 202–03, 206–07 (Henry
J. Aaron ed., 1999) (discussing and investigating this claim).
223. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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can cause difficulties in novel insurance markets or in reverseinsurance markets. There is accordingly no a priori reason to believe
they explain existing patterns of missing risk markets. Nonetheless,
certain ways of structuring REVEs may ameliorate or exacerbate
224
problems with risk heterogeneity, making these costs important to
identify and examine.
1. Adverse Selection. Adverse selection is a concern when
individuals have private information about their risk profiles that
insurers (or reverse insurers) either cannot observe or are prohibited
225
from taking into account when pricing risk. The difficulty arises
because individuals who possess this information are left free to
choose whether to enter into a particular risk-shifting transaction and
can be expected to make this selection in a manner adverse to the
226
insurer’s interests. Hence, adverse selection is a problem associated
with heterogeneity in risk arrangements rather than with any
particular risk configuration.
For example, if people know their genetic risk profile, but an
227
insurer either cannot learn it or is forbidden to base pricing on it,
insurance will be priced based on the average expected losses of all
sectors of the population. Because this price is likely to be a bad deal
for the best risks, they would be expected to flee the pool, assuming
they are permitted to do so; their exits will spur price increases in

224. See infra Part IV.B.2 for an explanation of how triangular REVEs may help to address
some risk-heterogeneity problems, and Part IV.C.2 for an examination of how heterogeneity in
default stickiness might interact with risk preferences to impact adverse-selection problems.
225. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, Information and Economic Behavior, in 4 COLLECTED
PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 136, 147–48 (1984)
(explaining how information asymmetries can create adverse-selection problems in insurance
markets); see also Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 632 (1976)
(noting the pricing problem presented when insureds have private information about accident
probabilities). The dynamic produced by such information asymmetries can also unravel
markets other than those in risk. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–92 (1970) (illustrating
this problem using the example of used cars).
226. See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 375–76 (2003) (noting the origins of the term “adverse
selection” in the insurance industry).
227. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (prohibiting genetic discrimination
in group health insurance plans and employment).

FENNELL IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

3/2/2011 1:22:40 PM

UNBUNDLING RISK

1341
228

reaction to the now-riskier pool, further exits, and so on. Insurers
may try to arrest this dynamic by creating a menu of insurance
229
alternatives designed to induce good and bad risks to self-segregate.
But this approach tends to keep low-risk individuals from being able
230
to purchase as much insurance as they would prefer.
The theoretical concerns about adverse selection would apply to
231
reverse-insurance situations as well. A health insurance opt-out
model would present concerns mirroring those associated with an
232
opt-in model. Other reverse-insurance settings—such as the sale of
tort claims—would present new problems. For example, suppose Rita
does things that look like they expose her to great risk of injury (such
as taking regular jogs along the shoulders of heavily traveled roads)
but has special skills that actually render the activities quite safe. In
this case, the payments she would receive in exchange for selling her
unmatured tort claims would be too high, assuming those payments
were initially based on the risks of an average actor with Rita’s

228. The potential for good risks to be driven from an insurance pool as a result of adverse
selection has been noted by many scholars. E.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability
and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 946 (1988); Kunreuther & Pauly, supra
note 19, at 100.
229. See Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 225, at 632–37; Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection
in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1237–38 (2004); see also
David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance 22–27 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6107, 1997), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w6107 (discussing a variety of strategies that might be used to combat adverse selection).
230. Even if both good and bad risks would prefer full coverage, the two groups cannot be
separated without making the package designed for good risks sufficiently unattractive to bad
risks—which would typically involve reducing the level of coverage. See Rothschild & Stiglitz,
supra note 225, at 630–38 (modeling this problem and describing the equilibrium result, as well
as the possibility that no equilibrium will be reached and that high and low risks will instead
unstably pool together); Siegelman, supra note 229, at 1235–39 (discussing the RothschildStiglitz model, one core conclusion of which is that “the good risks are often unable to purchase
as much insurance as they wish”). But see Siegelman, supra note 229, at 1253 (noting the
potential for screening applicants through the kinds of benefits provided, such as a health club
membership that would only be attractive to relatively fit individuals).
231. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost of
Choice, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 957, 1000–03 (2010) (discussing adverse selection as an impediment
to private contracting over medical malpractice liability); Choi & Spier, supra note 108, at 3
(noting an adverse-selection problem that would exist in the products liability context if parties
could contract over damages); Schwartz, supra note 110, at 428–29 (describing how adverse
selection creates difficulties for markets in unmatured tort claims).
232. The insurer would want to compensate low risks less for dropping out of the pool than
it would compensate high risks. But if it is unable to tell risks apart and must offer everyone the
same price, only low-risk people will find it a good deal, and only high-risk people will stay in
the pool. See Schwartz, supra note 110, at 428–29 (describing the market for unmatured tort
claims as “a classic ‘lemons market’”).
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observable characteristics. As more skilled actors like Rita enter the
reverse-insurance pool to obtain this bargain, however, reverse
insurers will reduce their payments to better reflect the exposure
being transferred to actors like Rita. As payouts drop, the reverseinsurance product will become less attractive to less skillful actors,
prompting exits that make the deal less attractive to reverse insurers,
233
and so on. Adverse selection may thus explain not only the failure
of some insurance markets to emerge, but also the absence of certain
kinds of reverse-insurance markets.
Despite the seemingly inexorable logic of adverse selection,
234
questions have been raised about its descriptive accuracy. For one
thing, insureds do not always possess better information about their
235
own risk profiles than do their insurers. The adverse-selection story
also assumes that people become more keen to purchase insurance as
their personal chances of experiencing a negative event rise. But this
236
may not be the case, at least not in all risk contexts. A growing body
of scholarship examines the possibility that a converse phenomenon
of “propitious” or “advantageous” selection better describes some
237
insurance markets.
The effects observed in ordinary opt-in

233. Another potential domain in which adverse selection might operate in this context
involves individual differences in “capacity to suffer.” See id. (describing the operation of an
adverse-selection dynamic analogous to the one presented in the text).
234. See, e.g., Siegelman, supra note 229, at 1224 (“[A]lthough theory demonstrates that
adverse selection can occur, and some instances have certainly been documented, neither the
theoretical models nor the empirical studies provide much support for its widespread
importance in insurance markets.”); id. at 1248–51, 1278–80 & tbl.2 (reviewing empirical work
on adverse selection). For a recent review of the empirical literature on adverse selection in
insurance markets, see Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in
Insurance Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39 (2010).
235. See Siegelman, supra note 229, at 1241 (questioning “whether insureds really do know
something that their insurers don’t”); see also id. at 1251–52 (observing that information
asymmetries may run in favor of insurers); Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, Testing
for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets, 108 J. POL. ECON. 56 (2000) (finding no
evidence of asymmetric information in an analysis of insurance contracts and accidents for
young drivers in France). An adverse-selection dynamic can also be produced if the law requires
insurers to ignore information that insureds are free to act upon.
236. See Cohen & Siegelman, supra note 234, at 40–41 (finding that the body of empirical
work on adverse selection suggests significant variation in the degree of correlation between
riskiness and coverage across insurance markets and pools of policies).
237. For a foundational treatment of propitious selection, see David Hemenway, Propitious
Selection, 105 Q.J. ECON. 1063 (1990). More recent explorations of propitious or advantageous
selection include, for example, David de Meza & David C. Webb, Advantageous Selection in
Insurance Markets, 32 RAND J. ECON. 249 (2001); Hanming Fang, Michael P. Keane & Dan
Silverman, Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market,
116 J. POL. ECON. 303 (2008); and Siegelman, supra note 229, at 1264–74.
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insurance markets might, however, operate asymmetrically in an optout regime, depending on the mix of factors driving insurance
238
choices.
2. Lumpiness. An additional argument against heterogeneity in
risk arrangements has recently been articulated by Jennifer Arlen in
239
the context of medical malpractice liability. Rather than have a
single society-wide arrangement for malpractice liability, it would be
possible for individual patients to contract with health care providers
over liability arrangements. For example, a patient might execute a
waiver that would undo legal arrangements that place liability on the
240
doctor. Arlen argues, however, that inputs into medical care tend to
be “lumpy” or discontinuous, so that it is not possible for health care
providers to perfectly scale back their precaution levels in light of
241
patients’ waivers. If it is impossible to selectively withhold the
benefits of precaution from those patients who execute waivers,
Arlen argues, precaution levels may exhibit the character of a public
242
good. The result may be a system in which some patients try to free243
ride on liability-induced precautions without contributing to them.
If every patient tries this, precaution levels may eventually drop
244
below the efficient level for most patients.
Of course, the patient opting out of a malpractice liability regime
would receive a different monetary outcome in the event of an injury
than would the patient who did not execute a waiver. What the
lumpiness analysis emphasizes is that the risk over which parties
transact is not fixed ex ante but instead depends at least in part on the
245
risk-bearing choices that other parties make. Lumpiness thus

238. See infra Part IV.C.2.
239. Arlen, supra note 231.
240. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 207 (discussing the use of such
waivers).
241. Arlen, supra note 231, at 992–93 & n.97.
242. Id. at 990, 992–93 & n.97.
243. Id. at 992–1000.
244. Id. at 990–91, 996. Arlen suggests it may be possible to address this problem by
contracting through Managed Care Organizations, although not without “substantially
exacerbating the adverse selection problem.” Id. at 1003–09.
245. Analogous points about the interdependence of choices to opt in or out have been
made in other contexts. See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 44–54
(1970) (analyzing the effects on institutions of the exit of those who, had they stayed, would
have been the most vocal in seeking change); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the
Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 80–81 (1987) (suggesting that the ability
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represents another facet of interdependence in risk-bearing that, like
adverse selection, suggests costs may flow from permitting
heterogeneity in risk arrangements.
3. Lack of Standardization. Another cluster of concerns about
permitting heterogeneity in risk arrangements relates to questions of
optimal standardization. Standardization’s potential benefits and
costs have been explored in the context of property’s numerus clausus
246
doctrine, as well as in the literature on boilerplate contractual
247
provisions. In these arenas, it has been suggested that fixed menus
or standardized terms can lower the cost of interactions by reducing
the amount of new information that must be gathered in each
248
instance.
Similar considerations may have relevance in the risk context.
Homebuyers entering a neighborhood filled with homeowners, for
instance, may find it easier to form settled expectations about the
likely behavior of their future neighbors if homeownership inevitably
connotes full ownership of upside and downside home-investment
risk than if some unknown proportion of their fellow homeowners
have offloaded some or all of this risk. Likewise, jurors in tort suits
may find it easier to set damages when they are certain the plaintiff
will recover the award than if some unknown proportion of plaintiffs
249
have alienated their recovery rights. More generally, to the extent

of parties to contract around a trust-investment rule may dissipate the will to litigate or to lobby
for legislation that would improve the rule for everyone).
246. An information-cost explanation for standardized property forms is presented in
Merrill & Smith, supra note 182. Other analyses of the numerus clausus doctrine in property law
include Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, 3D SERIES 237 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987);
Nestor Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597
(2008); and Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002).
247. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Henry
E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175
(2006).
248. See, e.g., Kahan & Klausner, supra note 247, at 719–27 (detailing “learning benefits”
and “network benefits” of boilerplate contract terms); Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 8
(observing that unusual property forms inflict an externality on those who must expend time
learning about the entitlement’s attributes, while standardized property forms economize on
such costs).
249. Evidentiary rules could keep specific information about a given plaintiff’s reverseinsurance transactions from jurors, but that would not eliminate the problem flagged in the text.
The problem is ameliorated to the extent sales of unmatured tort claims would foster large
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that other laws or social policies (including the provision of social
insurance) are predicated on how certain risks are arranged,
homogeneity in risk-bearing can simplify the design of these
surrounding elements.
IV. RETHINKING RISK REVISION
The discussion to this point has placed a large number of REVErelated categories, examples, advantages, objections, and
impediments on the table. In this last Part, I distill some policy
observations from the preceding analysis. Section A returns to the
taxonomy presented in Figure 3 to suggest that personal riskrearrangement opportunities follow patterns that appear to be shaped
more by history and societal framing than by logic or meaningful
normative distinctions. Some of the concerns that have been raised
about REVE transactions can be addressed through minor redesigns,
such as the removal of nonessential payment-timing elements, as
Section B explains. Sections C and D, respectively, show how
manipulating the two policy levers that a focus on unbundled risk
spotlights—the choice of the default and the stickiness of the
default—expands policy space. The newly visible alternatives may
offer novel ways to counter biases, more smoothly accommodate
multiple policy objectives, or harness other asymmetries associated
with opting out rather than in.
A. Missing Entries in the Risk Menu
One of the most striking facts highlighted by the taxonomy set
out in Figure 3 is the relative dearth of explicit bottom-row or eventdetracting REVEs available to individuals and households. It is easy
to come up with justifications for treating transactions involving ditch
risk differently than transactions involving gravy risk. But that argues
for distinguishing between the columns in Figure 3, not between the
rows. A rationale for treating event-detracting REVEs differently
than event-enhancing REVEs must be able to explain differences
between the top-row and bottom-row entries within each column.
250
Focusing just on the risk endstates that REVEs produce, such a
rationale is difficult to detect.
settlements of claims en masse so that individual cases would rarely go to trial if the underlying
claim had been sold. See supra note 111.
250. Below, I will consider some additional justifications for differential treatment and some
possible ways to address the concerns underlying those rationales. See infra Part IV.B–D.
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Consider first those REVEs involving ditch risk, the left-hand
column in Figure 3. Ditch exposure, an event-detracting REVE,
actually solves a moral-hazard problem by restoring incentives that
ditch coverage eliminates. The fact that ditches can produce both
externalities and internalities offers no reasoned basis for treating a
choice to enter into a ditch-exposure REVE any differently than the
failure to engage in an analogous ditch-coverage REVE. Concern
about downside exposure may prompt mandatory insurance
requirements, especially when unremediated losses will drop an
individual below the subsistence level. But that concern argues for
regulating ditch risk generally; it does not explain why a ditchexposure transaction should be viewed as particularly problematic.
To be sure, there may be some practical hurdles associated with ditchexposure REVEs, but these do not seem different in severity or kind
from those that have long plagued ditch-coverage REVEs.
The privileging of event-enhancing REVEs becomes even more
puzzling within the right-hand column in Figure 3, which contains two
varieties of gravy REVEs. Compare the event-enhancing entry, the
gravy gamble, with the corresponding event-detracting entry, the
gravy giveup. Both of these entries involve upside risk, yet there is no
obvious reason to make it easier to gamble for upside gains than it is
to exchange potential gravy for a sum certain. If gambles are
voluntary in the top-row situation, then why should people be
prohibited from using a bottom-row REVE to attain the same risk
position?
The issue here is consistency, not the overall level of riskrearrangement opportunities. Thus, if people are not forced to
purchase insurance that will protect them against losses from one set
of events (such as the death of a minor child due to an illness, or
injuries that occur within the home due to one’s own carelessness), it
is difficult to understand why they should be prohibited from
shedding societal insurance against the same losses when they are
caused by tortfeasors. The point can be flipped around: if people are
forced to insure at a very high level against losses caused by
tortfeasors, permitting them to be exposed to unremediated losses
251
that result from other causes requires some explanation.

251. Cf. Ronen Avraham & Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Accident Law for Egalitarians, 12
LEGAL THEORY 181, 187–88 (2006) (raising similar questions about the dramatically different
treatment that different kinds of bad luck receive).
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Similar analysis might be applied to insurance gaps that are a
function of unexamined bundling, such as the default packaging of
exogenous housing-market risk with homeownership. If people are
encouraged or even forced by their mortgage companies to insure
against one set of home-value losses, such as those from fire, the
practical unavailability of insurance against a different set of losses to
home values, such as those associated with market downturns, should
at least invite inquiry. This is not to suggest that perfect consistency in
insurance opportunities across domains is required or even
recommended; the point is simply that differences in risk-shifting
opportunities should map onto real differences in the costs or
consequences of offering REVEs, rather than merely emerge as
artifacts of the way insurance choices are presently bundled and
framed.
As already suggested, one coherent normative distinction might
focus on preventing exposure to unremediated losses, thus treating
left-column REVEs differently than right-column REVEs. Here, too,
consistency is important. If the goal is a certain subsistence level of
coverage, then transactions that reverse insure amounts over that
level should not be deemed any more problematic than the failure to
buy insurance in excess of the minimum level. In some cases, REVEs
that deal in ditch risk could be made subject to minimum insurance
252
253
requirements or bonding requirements.
B. Tweaking Transactions
Some REVEs may be viewed as problematic not because of the
risk endstates they produce, but because features of the transactions
themselves might induce people to choose wrongly. Similarly, the
heterogeneity produced by particular REVEs might be thought
uniquely likely to create difficulties within certain domains, even
when seemingly analogous domains tolerate well the heterogeneity
that comes from voluntary insurance. Yet in evaluating whether

252. Notably, most of the proposals for selling unmatured tort claims do not contemplate
that potential victims would walk away with large, unrestricted stacks of cash, but rather that
part of the savings would be used to purchase or fund insurance. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 2,
at 395 (proposing that potential victims of torts be allowed to sell their unmatured claims and
buy first-party insurance); O’Connell, supra note 111, at 697–711 (describing a system in which
insurers would acquire the potential tort claims of their insureds and use the amounts recovered
from those claims to fund first-party no-fault coverage).
253. Cf. Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements, supra note 209 (discussing minimum asset
requirements as a possible approach to the problem of judgment-proof defendants).
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presently absent REVEs must or should remain so, it is important to
examine the extent to which simple design tweaks can address these
sources of concern. Although there may be many modifications
capable of meeting various objections, two simple ones are
considered here: modifying the timing and form of payments, and
making the transaction a triangular one.
1. Timing and Form of Payments. Insurance and other REVEs
allow individuals to redistribute money among possible states of the
254
world. However, REVEs also commonly move money from one
part of the life cycle to another. If impediments to borrowing or
saving exist, REVEs may be affirmatively sought out as a means of
moving money earlier or later in time. While ordinary insurance
moves money to a later point in the life cycle (to the future state in
which one is ill or injured), reverse insurance typically moves money
earlier in the life cycle, to the uninjured state. Thus, where ordinary
255
insurance incorporates an element of saving, reverse insurance
seems to incorporate an element of dissaving.
If people are deemed likely to be poor agents of their future
selves primarily due to factors like myopia or a tendency to discount
256
hyperbolically, this conflation of risk and liquidity might cause
257
people to mischoose REVEs. Thus, some objections to event254. See supra text accompanying notes 30–35.
255. See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 47 (“Most private insurance involves a substantial
element of intertemporal loss spreading. In this sense it is just a form of saving.”).
256. People are said to discount hyperbolically if their valuation of a reward drops off
dramatically as it moves from the immediate present into the near future, but levels off in the
more distant future; the shape of the valuation over time forms a hyperbola. See GEORGE
AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL 32 & fig. 2B (2001) (depicting a hyperbolic discount curve);
David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 446–51 (1997)
(presenting a formal analysis of hyperbolic discounting). Hyperbolic discounting offers a leading
(although not uncontested) explanation for preference reversals that take the following
standard form: A person who would prefer $105 in 366 days to $100 in 365 days turns down the
chance for $105 tomorrow in favor of $100 today—even though the length of the delay and the
difference in the rewards is identical in the two cases. Frederick et al., supra note 222, at 25.
257. On the other hand, myopia could actually counter other cognitive biases under some
possible REVE designs, such as the weight-loss bets discussed in Abramowicz & Ayres, supra
note 50, at 4. For example, a dieter might place a sum of money at stake and then auction off the
right to receive that sum if she fails to achieve her desired weight by a certain date; the price
would be an expected value based on the probability the dieter will fail. See id. Using the
present Article’s terminology, the purchaser of the auctioned right undertakes a gravy gamble
while the dieter engages in a ditch-exposure transaction. As Professors Abramowicz and Ayres
explain, the possibility of getting cash upfront might prove inordinately attractive to someone
who discounts hyperbolically, yet if the would-be dieter is also naïve about the extent of her
own self-control problems, that same distortion might induce her to take on a bet that will
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detracting risk transactions may really be objections to the temporal
structure that the choice typically takes. For example, some might
oppose allowing people to sell their unmatured tort claims
(particularly in the absence of any first-party insurance requirement)
258
out of a concern about myopia. If people are short-sighted, they
might grab the lump of immediate cash without carefully weighing the
long-run consequences and later come to regret the decision.
Notice, however, that it is possible to design mechanisms that
break apart time preferences and risk preferences. Rather than
receive the expected value of one’s unmatured tort claims all at once,
for example, the payments could be spread out over a number of
years or decades. Similarly, concerns about hyperbolic discounting
might be addressed by interposing some period of time, such as six
months, between the sale of the claim and the delivery of the
259
(interest-adjusted) proceeds. Indeed, it is even possible to make the
expected value payment after the risky event’s outcome is known
260
under certain REVE designs. As long as an appropriate presentvalue equivalent is made available, the delay would not undermine
the purposes served by the REVE as such: catering to heterogeneity
261
in risk preferences.

ultimately prove helpful to her. Id. at 13–15. The possibility that cognitive biases might cancel
each other out in such ways has received theoretical attention as a manifestation of the general
theory of the second best. E.g., Gregory Besharov, Second-Best Considerations in Correcting
Cognitive Biases, 71 S. ECON. J. 12 (2004).
258. See Schwartz, supra note 110, at 425 (expressing the concern that potential victims
would sell their unmatured tort claims too cheaply due to “irrationally high discount rates”).
259. Hyperbolic discounting involves very steep discounting in the immediate short run and
much shallower discounting further out. See supra note 256.
260. Abramowicz and Ayres discuss an “ex post implementation” that achieves this result
by paying an individual taking on a downside risk an expected value payment only in those
states of the world in which the risky event has not occurred. Abramowicz & Ayres, supra note
50, at 8–9; see also id. at 8 (explaining that, because the expected value payment is made in
fewer states of the world under this implementation, the payment will accordingly be higher).
261. This is not to deny that altering the payment timing will have some impact on
individuals’ other risk sets, aside from the specific risk being transacted over. For example,
delaying payment means introducing some risk that death will occur first for reasons unrelated
to the risky event that is the subject of the REVE. Similarly, delays keep people from gaining
immediate access to funds that might be used in the interim for risky investments or additional
REVE transactions. If people could use the prospect of the upcoming payments as collateral for
immediate loans, this latter set of constraints would be lifted, although possibly at the cost of
defeating the purpose of the change in timing and form. The cognitive response triggered by an
immediate lump sum of cash in hand, however, may be quite different from the knowledge that
one can use the dollar amount to obtain financing.
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Likewise, to the extent that people exhibit a bias for lump sums
over equivalent streams of payments, this feature could be removed
from a given REVE. The point is a general one: any considerations
that are extraneous to the concentration or spread of risk, whether
involving the timing or form of payments or the time, place, or
conditions under which transactions are made available, can be
altered to more clearly present individuals with the choice between
variable outcomes and the expected value equivalent. The fact that
certain risk arrangements tend to come bundled with these other
features merely suggests that a more thoroughgoing form of risk
unbundling may be required.
Two caveats are in order. First, people’s cognitive biases likely
extend to matters of risk taking and insurance, as well as to questions
262
of the timing of payment. Thus, taking certain temporal elements
out of the equation is no guarantee against mischoosing. Yet the
discussion here is about clarifying what is essential to a given REVE
and what can be removed from it. Policymakers might indeed deem
mischoosing to be too great a hazard even after removing, say, the
opportunity to immediately obtain a lump of cash from a REVE. On
the other hand, it is possible that the remaining cognitive concerns
could be addressed separately, as through risk defaults that counter
263
cognitive biases.
Second, there are serious normative questions about whether it is
appropriate to constrict the temporal tradeoffs that people can make
in the course of reallocating risk, given that people may have quite
rational reasons for wanting to receive payouts on a particular
264
schedule. The question is sharpened by the fact that the capacity to
deliver immediate liquidity is one of the primary attractions of
REVEs, given imperfections in capital markets. Yet if removing
worrisome temporal elements is the only way to introduce a presently
unavailable REVE, then choice is expanded rather than contracted
by the move. My point is not to advocate for any particular design
choice, but only to emphasize that risk allocations can be

262. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 55–58 (discussing both “paternalistic” and
“semipaternalistic” rationales for doubting that voluntary insurance coverage will be adequate);
Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 88–97 (describing and explaining behavioral anomalies in
insurance-purchasing behavior).
263. See infra Part IV.C.
264. Scholars have noted the general difficulty in determining when an individual’s choice
should be viewed as a “mistake.” See, e.g., Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The
Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905, 926–28.
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reconfigured in ways that need not inevitably entail particular
payment arrangements.
2. Third-Party Transactors. Although parties to an interaction,
such as a manufacturer and a consumer, could reverse the risk
arrangement as between themselves, they may find it beneficial to
involve third-party insurers or reverse insurers in the REVE
transaction. As already noted, third-party transactors make possible
triangular risk arrangements that permit both parties to be insured or
265
exposed. The involvement of third parties may also carry some
additional advantages that can help to meet practical and normative
objections to REVEs.
First, opening up REVEs in a given area to third-party
transactors fosters competition, which can help address the concern
that some parties will feel pressured into selling claims too cheaply
266
(or paying too dearly for them). Competition does not necessarily
safeguard parties against making what are (for them) bad bargains,
but it does provide some check against monopolistic or exploitative
pricing.
Second, the availability of third-party transactors can help
address one of the reasons that default rules are often so potent: the
fear that moving away from them will send a negative signal to the
267
party with whom one is interacting. Often, parties will want their
counterparties to know about their risk arrangements precisely

265. See supra Part I.C.
266. See Cooter, supra note 2, at 386–87 (explaining how permitting sales to third parties
will encourage competition, which “will generate more information and higher prices”).
267. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 18, at 652–53, 660–65 (examining signaling
concerns associated with rejecting contract default provisions); Cass R. Sunstein, Human
Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 225–26 (2001) (noting signaling concerns in
the employment context). Of course, transacting with a third party would not help if the persons
to whom one fears sending an adverse signal would be aware of that transaction, as might be the
case if concerns are mostly about the signals sent to loved ones or even to oneself. For further
discussion of the signaling properties of insurance, see Robin Hanson, Insurance as Signal,
OVERCOMING BIAS (Sept. 14, 2009, 9:45 PM), http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/09/
insurance-as-signal.html.
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268

because of what it signals about them, but in other instances the
269
third-party involvement may helpfully mute an unwanted signal.
Third, the availability of third-party transactors can avoid some
of the difficulties that might otherwise attend heterogeneous risk
arrangements. For example, if it is unworkable for patients to
selectively opt out of medical malpractice coverage because the
270
precautions of the doctors are not scalable, patients could instead go
to a reverse insurer to whom they could sell their rights and who
would collect on their behalf, leaving the doctor’s liability unchanged
271
but merely altering who is the payee. Similarly, a triangular
arrangement that leaves both parties exposed to risk would address
272
moral-hazard concerns that might otherwise be present.
As these observations show, if direct reversals of risk allocations
between two parties present difficulties, curtailing REVEs is not the
only possible solution. Another alternative may be to even more fully
unbundle risk from the underlying interaction by throwing open
REVE opportunities to third parties.
C. Defaults
The law always makes an initial choice about risk allocation,
even when it does nothing more than leave a particular set of losses
273
where they fall. A focus on risk customization emphasizes that
society’s choice set is not limited to mandatory insurance and
voluntary opt-in insurance; it is also possible to start with a system
that insures people against loss and permit them to opt out. In this

268. See Abramowicz & Ayres, supra note 50, at 37–39 (noting the signaling potential of
placing bets on particular outcomes); Hanson, supra note 267 (discussing the possibility that the
purchase of insurance could in some contexts convey care and concern).
269. For example, an employee who insures against a failure to receive a promotion might
wish to keep this information from her employer in order to avoid signaling a low degree of
confidence that could translate into negative results at work.
270. See supra Part III.C.2.
271. Cf. Cooter & Porat, supra note 1, at 225 (explaining how contracts between antiinsurers and consumers in the products liability context “would restore incentives for care by
consumers, without eroding incentives for care by manufacturers”).
272. Id.; see also Choi & Spier, supra note 108, at 27 (presenting a model in which
manufacturers and consumers transact directly with each other and noting the moral-hazard
problems that might result from permitting product liability waivers under those circumstances).
273. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1091 (“When a loss is left where it falls in
an auto accident, it is not because God so ordained it. Rather it is because the state has granted
the injurer an entitlement to be free of liability and will intervene to prevent the victim’s friends,
if they are stronger, from taking compensation from the injurer.”).
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Section, I discuss some well-known and less-recognized
considerations that bear on this choice between defaults.
1. Sticky Starting Points. Considerable empirical evidence
274
suggests that defaults tend to stick. This provides one reason to
think carefully about the risk-related defaults that society has in
place, including those that are embedded without comment in legal
rules or social policies. If one risk allocation is generally deemed best
for most of the people, most of the time, making that the default
seems sensible—at least if one assumes that those for whom it is not
best do not differ systematically in terms of the size of the losses they
will suffer or the difficulties they will face in moving away from the
275
default.
A number of cognitive explanations for default stickiness have
276
277
been explored, but three are of particular interest here. First is a
simple pricing effect. Changing a risk allocation requires effort, and
278
effort is expensive to exert. Second is the “implicit advice” that
274. Some of the best-known research on the power of default rules is in the context of
401(k) plans, where automatic enrollment has been found to significantly impact savings
behavior. See, e.g., James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick,
Passive Decisions and Potent Defaults, in ANALYSES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 59 (David
A. Wise ed., 2005); Bridgette C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in
401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149 (2001). Work on risk taking has
also documented significant default effects. See Johnson et al., supra note 19, at 46–48
(presenting experimental findings showing significant effects depending on the default risk
regime); id. at 48 (observing that 20 percent of New Jersey motorists elected a “full right to sue”
where state law required opting into this right, whereas 75 percent of Pennsylvania motorists
retained this right where it was made the default under state law); see also Sunstein, supra note
19, at 114 (discussing these default effects).
275. See Thomas J. Miles, Posner on Economic Loss in Tort: EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1817–18 (2007). But see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 18, at 91 (describing
“penalty defaults,” which “are purposefully set at what the parties would not want”).
276. See, e.g., Isaac Dinner, Eric J. Johnson, Daniel G. Goldstein & Kaiya Liu, Partitioning
Default Effects: Why People Choose Not to Choose 3 (June 26, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352488 (collecting citations and identifying
three categories of reasons for default stickiness: “effort,” “implied endorsement,” and
“reference dependence”); Choi et al., supra note 274, at 60 (listing three reasons that defaults
matter in their model: the fact that moving away is a costly “act of commission,” the desire to
exploit the “option value of waiting,” and the “tendency to procrastination”).
277. A fourth, the interaction between signaling and defaults, is omitted here because its
potential to be redressed through third-party risk arrangements was discussed above. See supra
text accompanying note 267.
278. See, e.g., Dinner et al., supra note 276, at 3 (noting that choosing default options
requires no effort). The idea that defaults can be powerful even when the ability to opt out is
made readily and cheaply available lies at the heart of Cass Sunstein’s and Richard Thaler’s
“libertarian paternalism” proposals. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian
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279

defaults are often thought to provide. If people trust the authority
presumed to be behind the selection, they may be especially likely to
280
stay with the default risk allocation. Taking these two points
together, sticking with defaults can be viewed as a way of
281
economizing on search costs.
A third and closely related
explanation stems from the cognitive distinction between acts and
282
omissions. An act is more likely than an omission to trigger regret
283
(and hence the kind of anticipated regret that gives people pause).
When the act would involve moving away from coverage for a risk,
284
making a choice also inevitably draws attention to the risk. Because
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1181 (2003). Empirical work
suggesting that making decisions is cognitively draining supports this effect. See Roy F.
Baumeister, The Psychology of Irrationality: Why People Make Foolish, Self-Defeating Choices,
in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS: RATIONALITY AND WELL-BEING 3, 12–14
(Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) (reviewing literature on “decision fatigue”).
279. See Choi et al., supra note 274, at 70 (noting that defaults may provide “implicit
advice”); see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 35, 83 (observing that defaults will
carry more power in contexts where consumers perceive that they “come with an implicit
endorsement from the default setter” or that they “represent[] the normal or even the
recommended course of action”); Dinner et al., supra note 276, at 3 (noting that defaults may
amount to an “implied endorsement”). A related possibility is that people might assume some
help will be forthcoming if things go systematically awry with the default choice (as in a natural
disaster, if the default is to remain uninsured).
280. Some scholars have noted a parallel in Lon Fuller’s discussion of formalism as serving
(among other things) a “cautionary” function. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 18, at 124 (citing
and discussing Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941)); see also
Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383,
392–93 (2007) (discussing the use of Fuller’s work by Ayres and Gertner).
281. For a discussion of the relevance of search costs to insurance decisions, see Kunreuther
& Pauly, supra note 19, at 76–77.
282. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 274, at 60 (noting costliness of “acts of commission”);
Johnson et al., supra note 19, at 48 (discussing the potential relevance to insurance decisions of
work showing an asymmetry between acts and omissions).
283. For discussion of research on the asymmetry between commission and omission, see,
for example, RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 73 (1992); Daniel Kahneman, Varieties of Counterfactual Thinking, in WHAT
MIGHT HAVE BEEN: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 375, 388–92
(Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson eds., 1995); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The
Psychology of Preferences, SCI. AM., Jan. 1982, at 160, 173; and supra note 199 and
accompanying text. The regret-avoidance explanation, to the extent it hinges on moves from the
status quo, also dovetails with Dinner et al.’s discussion of “reference dependence.” See Dinner
et al., supra note 276, at 5–7 (positing that defaults act as “‘instant’ endowments” that alter the
perceived reference point from which choices are evaluated).
284. See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 167 n.25 (“Opting in[to liability] may be different
from opting out, for it might seem that where one party opts into liability, he has a greater
awareness of what he is doing than when he allows the other party to opt out of liability.”).
After providing a counterexample in which a “giant milling company us[es] a form contract
requiring opting into liability,” Calabresi concludes that “knowledge or awareness of risk may
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knowledge of risks and of the availability of insurance plays an
285
important role in coverage decisions, the default setting’s capacity
to influence what people pay attention to could prove independently
286
important.
In the present context, these cognitive factors are only part of the
story. When a third-party insurer or reverse insurer provides the
service of rearranging risk, the REVE will not be actuarially fair, but
will instead build in a “loading fee” to cover administrative costs and
287
a profit margin. As a result, some people who would have accepted
the REVE at an actuarially fair price will instead stick with the
default. The larger the administrative costs are, the stickier the
default will be, although this stickiness can be reduced through
subsidies or measures designed to reduce transaction costs. If there
are asymmetries in the administrative costs of moving in one direction
rather than another, this would of course offer an additional reason
for attending carefully to the default choice.
2. Heterogeneously Inertial. Default rules, for the reasons
already suggested, tend to be remarkably inertial. But it is likely that
288
people are heterogeneous in their susceptibility to inertia’s pull.

affect the choice of whom we wish to hold initially liable and whether we wish to allow such a
party to exculpate himself.” Id.
285. See KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 55, at 57–61.
286. This point relates to the argument for a “penalty default”—a default so unattractive
that it encourages opting out, and hence conscious consideration of the alternatives. See Ayres
& Gertner, supra note 18, at 91; see also Choi et al., supra note 274, at 72 (observing that such
“bad” defaults may counter procrastination).
287. See Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate
Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 1147, 1168 (2006) (“Insurance premiums reflect not only the policy’s risk—an
actuarially determined probability of loss—but also a loading fee reflecting the insurer’s costs
and profits.”).
288. Some existing empirical work has uncovered patterns of heterogeneity in default
stickiness. See, e.g., Madrian & Shea, supra note 274, at 1158–61 & tbl.IV, 1171–73 & tbl.VIII,
1185 (2001) (finding that a large employer’s switch from an opt-in 401(k) program to one
featuring automatic enrollment with an opt-out had much larger effects on young workers, lowearning workers, women, and minorities; not only did these groups participate at much higher
levels under automatic enrollment than they did under an opt-in system, they were more likely
to stick with the specific default contribution level and investment allocation). The possibility
that moving away from one default might be easier than moving away from another has been
raised in a number of contexts. Such an effect might occur (among other reasons) if the parties
who occupy one side of a given transaction are systematically less likely to agree to a switch if
they begin with the entitlement than are the parties who occupy the other side of the
transaction. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 122–23 (raising the possibility that workers would
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This possibility becomes interesting if those differences are
289
potentially correlated with either risk preferences or risk profiles.
Such correlations do not seem implausible, although it is not selfevident which way they would run. Those who behave in ways that
make them better risks or who are very averse to risk may also be
adept at micromanaging their lives and practiced at overcoming
inertia. If people are bad risks because they are careless, that lack of
care might manifest itself in a tendency not to bother with the hassles
of gathering information, filling out paperwork, or otherwise
proactively engaging in decisionmaking. On the other hand, perhaps
risk seekers are marked by an extreme lack of complacence that
makes them less susceptible to inertia. Moreover, to the extent that
sticking with a default means accepting a social planner’s advice on a
290
particular question or conforming one’s behavior to that of others,
risk seekers might be more willing to break away from the pack or to
shun official recommendations.

overvalue particular rights and be unwilling to waive them, even when it would be in their best
interest to do so).
289. Recent empirical work has explored heterogeneity in risk preferences. See Rachel
Croson & Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences in Preferences, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 448, 449–54 (2004)
(reviewing experimental findings on the greater risk aversion of women, discussing possible
reasons, and noting exceptions in managerial and professional subsets); Peggy D. Dwyer, James
H. Gilkeson & John A. List, Gender Differences in Revealed Risk Taking: Evidence from Mutual
Fund Investors, 76 ECON. LETTERS 151, 156–57 (2002) (finding evidence that women accept less
investment risk than men, as well as positive effects of wealth and education on willingness to
take investment risks); Jonah Gelbach, Jonathan Klick & Lesley Wexler, Passive
Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense to Pay Too Little, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 817–19
(2009) (reviewing empirical literature on gender differences in risk preferences); Luigi Guiso &
Monica Paiella, Risk Aversion, Wealth, and Background Risk, 6 J. EUROPEAN ECON. ASSOC.
1109, 1109, 1141–42 (2008) (examining the relationship between wealth and risk aversion, as
well as other aspects of heterogeneity in risk preferences); Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David
Huffman & Uwe Sunde, Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability? 100
AM. ECON. REV. 1238, 1257 (2010) (finding, in a study of German adults, greater risk aversion
among people with lower scores on an IQ test); Daniel J. Benjamin, Sebastian A. Brown &
Jesse M. Shapiro, Who Is “Behavioral”? Cognitive Ability and Anomalous Preferences 1 (May
5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=675264 (finding, in a
study of Chilean high school students, less “small-stakes” risk aversion among those with higher
scores on standardized tests). Another interesting line of work assesses the degree of correlation
in risk preferences across domains. E.g., Levon Barseghyan, Jeffrey Prince & Joshua C.
Teitelbaum, Are Risk Preferences Stable Across Contexts? Evidence from Insurance Data, AM.
ECON. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1220663; Liran Einav, Amy
Finkelstein, Iuliana Pascu & Mark R. Cullen, How General Are Risk Preferences? Choices
Under Uncertainty in Different Domains (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
15686, 2010).
290. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.

FENNELL IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

3/2/2011 1:22:40 PM

UNBUNDLING RISK

1357

In either case, these differences could bear on the question of
adverse selection. In the standard adverse-selection story, people who
are bad risks opt in while people who are good risks stay out. But
scholarly exploration of the converse phenomenon of “advantageous”
291
or “propitious” selection raises some interesting questions. If much
of what drives advantageous selection in the opt-in model is simple
inertia on the part of the less-good risks (who stay out of the pool),
flipping the default so everyone starts off insured could generate a
risk pool that contains more of these less-good risks. On the other
hand, if risk seekers are especially prone to action, their exits under
such a system might outstrip any exits from the pool by the good
292
risks. Further, if the risk aversion of many good risks is significantly
influenced by framing, the prospect of taking on additional exposure
through a reverse-insurance move might be much less attractive than
a failure to insure in an opt-in system. This could lead some good
risks to stay in a default-insured system even when they would not opt
in under a default-uninsured system.
The direction and magnitude of these effects would be an
excellent avenue for further empirical research. It is possible that
adverse-selection effects could be aggravated or mitigated based
entirely on default choice. If so, then flipping defaults could make
some REVEs that have been ruled out on adverse-selection grounds
more feasible.
3. Risk and Redistribution. The choice of default may often seem
to be driven by distributive considerations. Providing a taxpayer with
publicly funded insurance and letting her opt out for cash places her
in a different distributive position than simply leaving her free to buy
293
her own coverage from a no-insurance baseline. But the choice of
291. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
292. Perhaps suggestive on this point is evidence on when low-risk insureds do and do not
drop out of policies with “guaranteed renewability” provisions that insure against selective
experience-rated increases in policy premiums. See SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R.
NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 351–52 (2d ed. 2004) (attributing the
availability of guaranteed renewability provisions for individuals and the resistance to such
provisions in small-group insurance settings in the period prior to legal mandate to the higher
transaction costs of switching for individuals); Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 107–08
(citing Harrington & Niehaus, and observing that “[t]he same type of inertia and inattention
that sometimes results in failure of insurance markets to emerge . . . may sometimes preserve
them as well”).
293. This assumes, as seems plausible, that the funding mechanism for public insurance
draws from individuals in a pattern that differs from the price structure each would encounter in
purchasing private insurance.
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default need not dictate a particular distributive result, given the
ability to combine different funding mechanisms with different riskallocation baselines. Thus, an opt-in system can be coupled with
subsidies, and an opt-out system can be funded by individual insureds
in a manner corresponding to the pricing structure of private
insurance (the direct deduction of insurance premiums from
paychecks offers a concrete example).
Consideration of alternative defaults can become especially
important when risk pooling consciously builds in a redistributive
element, as it often does. Genetic testing offers a case in point.
Assume society has decided it is normatively inappropriate for people
with different levels of genetic risk to bear different insurance costs.
One approach is to pass a law mandating that insurers ignore the
294
results of genetic tests in setting premiums. If people know their
own risk levels, however, those at lower risk may exit the pool to
avoid cross-subsidizing those at higher risk—the usual adverse295
selection problem. But if society were to switch to a new baseline in
which everyone is automatically insured absent a decision to opt out,
it becomes feasible to maintain society’s normative commitment
while eliminating the feature of the situation responsible for the
adverse-selection dynamic—the suppression of relevant risk-related
information.
Suppose, for example, that health insurance is provided to
everyone as an initial matter and funded in a way that does not
296
distinguish among genetic risks. Because the cost of covering those
with risky genes would be built into the public finance system and
spread across all taxpayers, everyone would be a mandatory
participant in the redistributive scheme that subsidizes the premiums
297
of those with unlucky genes. Yet it would still be possible to allow
people to exchange their individual insurance claims against the

294. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 227–30 and accompanying text.
296. Although the example in the text focuses on genetic risks, the same analysis would
apply to preexisting conditions or any other factor that society might view as normatively
inappropriate to factor into the cost of coverage. See, e.g., Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially
Fair Insurance Pricing Actually Fair? A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 355 (1997) (examining insurers’ use of domestic violence victim status in coverage
and premium determinations and legislation restricting that practice).
297. For discussion of explicit and implicit ways to package redistribution based on (or
insurance against) unlucky genetic endowments, see generally Logue & Slemrod, supra note
166.
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system for a sum representing the expected value of those claims.
Thus, someone at low genetic risk could opt out of insurance but
would get only the low expected value payment associated with her
risk class; this would often be much less than the amount she had paid
toward the program in taxes because she would not be permitted to
299
opt out of the redistributive component of the policy. Unlike in the
opt-in case, there is no public policy difficulty with pricing the
expected value of the claims of those opting out as accurately as
possible, using genetic information or any other available information
sources; indeed, such pricing would be necessary to keep the system
from unraveling.
Thus, there may be an interesting policy asymmetry between
taking account of certain kinds of information (here, genetic
predispositions) when pricing insurance premiums (the opt-in price)
versus taking account of that information when pricing reverse
insurance (the opt-out price). My objective is not to defend this
particular approach to insurance or to the use of genetic information,
but rather to show that it is possible to break apart the redistributive
and risk-pooling elements that a particular social policy embodies,
and to allow people to opt out of the latter without endangering the
former. By using relevant information rather than suppressing it, an
adverse-selection dynamic can be avoided. The same principle could
be applied to a wide range of situations in which risk pooling is
combined with redistribution. Society might, for example, be more
willing to allow people to opt out of certain portions of the social
welfare system if it could accurately price their expected claims
300
against the system (very close to zero for some individuals).

298. Of course, some increment would have to be deducted from this amount to cover
administrative costs; I have omitted that point from the textual example for simplicity.
299. People at high genetic risk could also opt out and receive the (higher) expected value
equivalent of their potential claims—a move that would effectively convert society’s in-kind
redistribution to them (in the form of insurance) into cash redistribution. I thank Ariel Porat for
discussions on this point. For further discussion of the alternative ways in which society might
choose to meet the normative commitment that genetic nondiscrimination rules embody, see
generally Logue & Slemrod, supra note 166.
300. There might be other reasons to oppose such a move, however, given the potential
interdependence among risk choices. For example, allowing opt-outs may change the political
economy in undesirable ways. See supra note 245.
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D. Pushing, Sticking, Blocking
After setting an initial risk allocation, society must also decide
301
how hard or easy it will be to move away from that allocation.
Making a risk arrangement the default selection makes it effortless to
choose, while an alternative that people are literally blocked or
stopped from selecting is prohibitively difficult to choose. Between
these extremes lies a spectrum of possibilities, from making a choice
simpler or more attractive to making it more difficult or less
302
attractive.
1. Catalysts. Making a risk allocation the default alternative is
often the most direct and powerful way to encourage its adoption, but
this approach may not always be feasible or may be undesirable for
other reasons. In such cases, other ways to unstick the default
selection may be sought. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s notion
303
of “one-click paternalism,” which focuses on keeping opting-out
costs low, offers one approach. This type of low-cost opting out,
however, has been proposed in the context of governmentally chosen
defaults that are, by assumption, deemed normatively desirable. Thus,
proponents do not fear that people will opt for the alternative too
rarely; because the superiority of the default selection is presumed,
small numbers of opt-outs are counted as successes, not occasions for
304
concern. Moreover, the alternative arrangement is guaranteed to be
delivered upon a single mouse-click. For default selections falling
outside of this paradigm, easing or encouraging shifts may require
overcoming obstacles on the supply side, the demand side, or both.
On the supply side, a REVE will obviously be maximally difficult
305
to elect if no counterparty is willing to enter into it. New markets in
301. The relative neglect of this question has been noted in other contexts. See McDonnell,
supra note 280, at 384 (“Despite the longstanding debate over default versus mandatory rules,
scholars have paid much less attention to how easy it is to opt out of the default rules—that is,
how ‘sticky’ the rules are.”).
302. See id. at 385 (“Rather than the binary choice of labeling a rule as default or
mandatory, we can place various rules along a spectrum of stickiness.”).
303. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 248–49 (discussing “one-click paternalism,”
which aims for opt-out procedures that are no more difficult than a single mouse-click).
304. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 278, at 1191 (stating that low numbers of people
opting out of default savings plans “supports (though it does not prove) the claim that they are
helped by a system that makes joining easy”). But see Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism
Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1254 (2005) (rejecting the idea that one can infer
anything about preferences from outcomes produced solely by an inertial response to a default).
305. See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 98–110 (examining supply-side issues).
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REVEs might be jump-started through governmental incentives
306
directed at spurring innovation in risk or other efforts aimed at
reducing transaction costs associated with reversing background risk
307
allocations. Reversibility could also be advanced by requiring
parties to offer an alternative risk arrangement along with the default,
308
or by subsidizing them for offering this alternative.
309
Additional problems exist on the demand side. Research on
consumers’ insurance choices has found that behavior diverges
considerably from a utility-maximization model, with consumers
310
variously purchasing “too much” and “too little” insurance. A
rational-maximizer model would predict a greater willingness to pay
to insure against large, unlikely losses than against routine, small
311
losses, yet people often exhibit the opposite tendency. People are
generally reluctant to purchase insurance against catastrophic low312
probability events, but often obtain seemingly anomalous levels of
coverage against small and routine losses, such as minor preventative
313
health expenditures or problems with low-cost consumer goods.

306. See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 195, at 208 (proposing subsidies for new markets).
307. See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 116–17 (discussing a possible
governmental role in lowering transaction costs in insurance markets).
308. The converse approach—not allowing a reversal alternative unless the original
alternative is separately priced—is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 320–21.
309. See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 174–87 (examining demand-side issues).
310. See BARON, supra note 29, at 508–11; Johnson et al., supra note 19, at 35–37, 48–49;
Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 119–20; Slovic et al., supra note 29, at 46–47. As the
discussion above suggested, however, there are some additional factors that complicate
assumptions about what is the “right” amount of insurance for people to purchase. For
discussion of some of these factors, see Schwarcz, supra note 19, passim; and see also supra text
accompanying notes 36–41. For example, if people derive utility from insurance in ways other
than through the money it provides, their behavior might be maximizing even if it would not
appear that way to an onlooker. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., Slovic et al., supra note 29, at 54–71 (presenting and analyzing results of
experimental studies that gave people choices about whether and how to insure against risks in
hypotheticals involving draws from an urn and a more concrete “farm game”).
312. See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 92–93. There are some exceptions to
this pattern that suggest errors running in the opposite direction. For example, people appear
overly willing to insure against extremely unlikely events that are highly mentally available. See
id. at 94–95 (discussing demand for flight insurance); see also Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 31–33
(describing the demand for catastrophe insurance as “bimodal”). There is also heterogeneity in
willingness to pay for insurance coverage at all. For example, a significant subset of people
(dubbed “invincibles” in the literature to signify their overoptimism) shuns health insurance
altogether. See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 98, at 79.
313. See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 65–66, 113–14; Cutler & Zeckhauser,
supra note 164, at 19–20, 25–28.
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Similarly, deductibles tend to be much smaller than utility theory
314
would predict.
A variety of approaches to these apparent patterns of
mischoosing have been discussed in the literature, including strategies
315
that rely on bundling and framing. For example, a tendency to
ignore low-probability risks might be countered by combining
coverage for several such risks or aggregating risks over longer time
316
periods. Overoptimism and an aversion to spending insurance
dollars for “nothing” might be addressed through systems that
317
provide rebates to those who do not make claims. Rebates could
also be used to reframe (and perhaps improve) deductible choices,
given research indicating that charges for insurance use (deductibles)
are perceived differently from credits for insurance nonuse
318
(rebates). To the extent these approaches lower cognitive resistance
to welfare-enhancing (or externality-reducing) REVEs, they would
qualify as catalysts here. Other demand-side efforts might be directed
at generating information and social support for new or
unconventional risk-bearing arrangements.
2. Dampeners. That a risk allocation is not the default already
puts something of a damper on it. But it is possible to do more, short
of outright bans, to either discourage particular choices or minimize
instances of mischoosing. Some of the design approaches discussed
above, such as altering the timing and form of payments, could serve
that function. Other familiar strategies to dampen shifts would
include a more cumbersome administrative process, regulations that

314. See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 88–90; Justin Sydnor, (Over)insuring
Modest Risks, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 177, 177–79 (2010).
315. E.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 111–18; Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 40–45.
316. For a discussion of such strategies, see, for example, Howard Kunreuther & Mark
Pauly, Neglecting Disaster: Why Don’t People Insure Against Large Losses?, 28 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5, 16 (2004); Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 40–41; Slovic et al., supra note 29, at
70–71. See also Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 19, at 117, on bundling as a mechanism for
lowering transaction costs.
317. See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 98, at 82 (proposing a “tontine” approach to health
insurance that would pay a cash bonus to those who end up not using their coverage).
318. See Johnson et al., supra note 19, at 42–46 (studying potential framing effects in
assessment of rebates for nonuse versus deductibles for use, and finding that rebates for nonuse
make disability policies more attractive).
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raise the effective price of the alternative, waiting periods before a
319
choice becomes final, and so on.
Another approach would require that a REVE be permitted only
when the default arrangement remains available at a separately stated
price. For example, although the law often disallows waivers of
liability (an attempted reversal of the risk allocation in the tort
system), some commentators have argued that such waivers should be
permitted if they are offered along with a separately priced
320
alternative in which traditional tort liability is preserved. One could
imagine additional variations on this theme in which the two prices,
or the gap between them, is not left entirely to the discretion of the
party offering the good or service, but is instead keyed to differences
in the costs of offering the two alternatives. Such refinements bear an
intellectual kinship with liability rules, in which transactions are eased
by permitting one party to unilaterally accomplish a desired change in
321
an entitlement structure upon payment of a specified price.
The ultimate dampener, of course, is an outright ban. Although
bans may be appropriate in some contexts, the preceding discussion
suggests that policymakers might first consider precisely why a given
REVE seems objectionable, whether its objectionable features can be
cost-effectively excised without doing away with it altogether, and
whether some measure short of a prohibition would respond to
concerns about it. Perhaps the strongest case for bans emerges when
heterogeneity in risk arrangements is itself problematic, as through
adverse selection. Even there, however, it is worth examining whether
heterogeneity reached from different starting points with different
degrees of stickiness can do a better job of avoiding these difficulties.

319. In-kind impositions (waiting periods, extra mouse-clicks, queues) are usually thought to
be especially costly because they destroy value outright rather than merely transferring it
elsewhere. See, e.g., DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 342–43 (1982).
320. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for
Products Liability Reform, 72 TEX. L. REV. 803, 821–23 (1994) (discussing this proposal and
quoting the ALI Reporters’ Study that deemed the idea worthy of “further attention”);
Schwartz, supra note 34, at 407 (discussing the possible advantages of a system that would
require manufacturers of potentially harmful products to offer buyers a choice between two
prices—“full” and “reduced”—that differ as to strict liability coverage).
321. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1092 (explaining how liability rules work).
More generally, entitlement theory could bring important insights to risk shifting. Morris took a
step in this direction by including “Transferred Claim rules” in her taxonomy of entitlements in
Morris, supra note 2, at 866–75.
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CONCLUSION
Familiar devices like insurance policies and lottery tickets allow
people to rearrange risk, but they offer access to only a small subset
of imaginable risk configurations. Law, public policy, and entrenched
commercial and social practices also pervasively structure risk, but
they typically do so without comment and without offering any means
for undoing the resulting risk allocation. In this Article, I have used
the REVE framework to direct attention to the enormous number of
untapped possibilities for reallocating risk. Unlike most existing work
on the topic, however, this Article does not argue the merits of any
particular rearrangement of risk. Rather, it makes a case for paying
attention to risk customization itself. Doing so not only points the
way to new alternatives but also illuminates gaps in existing
opportunities to trade in unbundled risk.
Many theoretically possible REVEs are doubtless unavailable
for very good reasons—perhaps markets for them cannot be
sustained, the moral-hazard problems attending them are too great,
or the heterogeneity that they would introduce into risk allocations
would be independently problematic. But it is also quite likely that
many of the missing entries in the menu are absent for reasons that
do not withstand careful scrutiny. Society’s framing of various risk
situations may have needlessly placed certain options off limits, and
the tendency of discussions to conflate distinct objections may also
have impeded resort to new risk-management tools. Finding new,
workable alternatives to existing risk configurations offers the
possibility of efficiency gains. An expanded menu of alternatives may
also offer as-yet-unexplored opportunities to realize gains by
exploiting the asymmetries associated with starting in one place
rather than another. Asking how an alternative risk arrangement
would look also directs attention to the often unacknowledged ways
in which law spreads risk across groups or concentrates it on
particular parties. Even if particular REVEs are ultimately rejected as
unworkable, considering them carries the threshold benefit of
allowing us to see more clearly how existing arrangements manage
risk.
At bottom, the Article argues for a move to a new analytic
baseline in thinking about risk. Risk is presently distributed and
rearranged in very limited ways that are unlikely to represent the full
complement of socially useful configurations. Systematically
exploring possible risk moves pushes us to ask, with Arrow, how the
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world would look if “we could introduce into the economic system
any institutions we wish for shifting risks instead of being confined to
322
those developed historically.” Rather than unreflectively accept the
smattering of risk arrangements that history and cognition have
served up over time or engage in a haphazard and piecemeal
contemplation of specific alternatives, scholars and policymakers
might usefully work backward from the expanded set of alternatives
suggested by the logic of risk unbundling.

322. Arrow, supra note 7, at 138.

